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The Statute of Frauds and Oral Promises of Job
Security: The Tenuous Distinction Between
Performance and Excusable Nonperformance
∗

Daniel P. O’Gorman
I.

INTRODUCTION

In general, an employment relationship between an employer
and an employee is considered to be on an “at will” basis, meaning
that either the employee or the employer can terminate the relation1
ship at any time for any reason, without liability. An employment re∗
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1
See RICHARD A. BALES, JEFFREY M. HIRSCH & PAUL M. SECUNDA, UNDERSTANDING
EMPLOYMENT LAW 1 (2007) (noting that employment “at will” means that an employer or employee can terminate the employment relationship for any reason); SAMUEL
ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 39 (3d
ed. 2008) (“American common law generally construes employment for an indefinite
or unstated term as a relationship which may be terminated ‘at will’ by either party.”); Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread of At-Will Employment as an Interjurisdictional Race to the Bottom of Employment Standards, 75 TENN. L. REV. 453, 459 (2008)
(“Today, the at-will rule remains the default employment rule in every state but Montana . . . .”); Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 118, 118 (1976) (“In almost every jurisdiction in the United States an
employer can discharge an employee without notice and without cause unless the
duration of the employment relation is specified in an employment contract.”). The
classic statement of the employment-at-will doctrine is that an employer has the right
to “dismiss their employees at will . . . for good cause, for no cause or even for cause
morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.” Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R.
Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179
S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915); see Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and
Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 MO. L. REV. 679, 683 (1994)
(referring to the Payne statement as the “now classic statement of the rule”). Montana is the exception. See Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -915 (Westlaw through 2009); see also MODEL EMPLOYMENT
TERMINATION ACT (1991). Interestingly, the Montana statute was enacted after employers complained of large damage awards for wrongful terminations based on violations of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Jonathan Tompkins, Legislating the Employment Relationship: Montana’s Wrongful-Discharge Law, 14 EMP.
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lationship will be construed as other than “at will,” however, if a con2
tract or statute so provides.
Typical examples of written contracts providing for job security
include collective bargaining agreements between unions and employers, which almost always include a provision prohibiting the employer from terminating employees for other than “just cause” or
3
4
“good cause,” and contracts between employers and key employees.
REL. L.J. 387, 387 (1998). Although the statute prohibits terminations without just
cause, it limits damages to lost wages. Id. at 394.
2
See BALES, HIRSCH & SECUNDA, supra note 1, at 1 (same); ESTREICHER & HARPER,
supra note 1, at 39 (noting that a contract or statute can create an exception to the
“at will” rule). Noteworthy examples of statutory exceptions to the “at will” rule include the anti-discrimination statutes, which prohibit covered employers from terminating employees because of their race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or
disability. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634
(2006) (age); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(2006) (race, color, religion, sex, and national origin); Americans With Disabilities
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006) (disability); see also National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006) (prohibiting covered employers
from terminating employees for engaging in concerted activities to improve working
conditions). Also, government employees “are protected by tenure arrangements or
other civil service procedural devices.” Theodore J. St. Antoine, You’re Fired!, HUM.
RTS. Q., Winter 1982, at 32, 34.
3
See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Industrial Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1410 (1967) (noting that
“just cause” provisions are “typically found in collective agreements”); Mary Ann
Glendon & Edward R. Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the Employment Relationship: An
Essay on the New Property, 20 B.C. L. REV. 457, 462 (1979) (“[P]ractically all collective
bargaining agreements provide in substance that no employee in the bargaining unit
may be discharged, suspended, or otherwise disciplined except for ‘just,’ ‘good,’ or
‘proper’ cause . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Gary Minda, The Common Law of Employment
At-Will in New York: The Paralysis of Nineteenth Century Doctrine, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939,
946 (1985) (“[P]rivate sector employees enjoy job security through collective bargaining provisions permitting employer discipline or discharge only for ‘just cause.’
Nearly every collective bargaining agreement negotiated by a union today contains a
provision that protects members of the bargaining unit against unjust discipline and
discharge.”); Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L.
REV. 999, 1007 (1955) (noting that collective bargaining agreements generally provide that discipline and discharge “shall be for cause, or good cause”); Clyde W.
Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 78 (2000) (noting “[t]he near universal acceptance of just cause
protection in collective agreements”); St. Antoine, supra note 2, at 34 (noting eighty
percent of collective bargaining agreements “expressly prohibit discharge or discipline except for ‘cause’ or ‘just cause.’” (footnote omitted)).
4
See St. Antoine, supra note 2, at 34 (noting that one of the three different
groups of employees who have avoided the at-will rule include “the handful of persons whose knowledge or talents are so unusual and valuable that they have the leverage to negotiate a contract for a fixed term with their employer”); Summers, supra
note 3, at 68 (observing that only upper-level managers have employment contracts
with a provision providing for job security).
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In the absence of a union or the employee being a key employee, it is
unusual, however, for an employee and an employer to have a written
contract promising job security. Some courts have held that employee manuals and handbooks distributed by an employer can con5
stitute a contract providing for job security, but courts are often re6
luctant to make such a finding, and in any event, a manual’s or
handbook’s contractual nature can usually be avoided by an explicit
7
disclaimer indicating that it is not a contract.
An oral promise of job security can, however, rise to the level of
8
an enforceable promise. For example, an employer might orally
promise the employee that he or she will remain employed for a definite period of time, or for as long as he or she performs satisfactori9
ly, or that he or she will only be terminated for good cause.
10
Even if such a promise is otherwise enforceable, however, the
oral nature of the promise renders it subject to a Statute of Frauds
11
(“the Statute”) defense. Specifically, such a promise might be considered incapable of being performed within a year, thus necessitat5

See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 885
(Mich. 1980) (allowing a handbook to be considered part of the employment contract); Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1082, 1101
(1984) (noting that Toussaint “was considered a breakthrough decision”).
6
See, e.g., Walton v. Health Care Dist. of Palm Beach County, 862 So. 2d 852, 855
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“Florida’s courts have expressed a decided reluctance to
find that provisions in an employee handbook or policies and procedures manual
rise to the level of enforceable rights . . . .”).
7
See Summers, supra note 3, at 75 (“[T]his protection has been seriously undercut by allowing employers to escape contractual liability by including in the handbook a disclaimer provision . . . .”). See generally Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 326 (1991) (examining the
use of disclaimers in employee handbooks).
8
See Lucy Haroutunian, Comment, Employee, You Have a Job For Life: But Is This
Oral Promise Enforceable Under the Statute of Frauds?, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 493, 496 (1998)
(“Often, due to the lack of a written contract, an employee’s only evidence of a contract is an oral assurance or oral promise by an employer or an employer’s agent that
the employee has job security.”).
9
See BALES, HIRSCH & SECUNDA, supra note 1, at 43 (“The first way at-will employment typically is changed is by a contract between the employer and an individual employee. Such a contract may be written or oral, express or implied, definiteterm or satisfaction.”); Haroutunian, supra note 8, at 496 (“An example is a promise
that an employee has a job for life or for as long as he performs satisfactorily.”).
10
See, e.g., Montgomery County Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex.
1998) (holding that employer’s oral assurance to employee that she would remain
employed as long as she did a good job was too indefinite to constitute an offer).
11
See BALES, HIRSCH & SECUNDA, supra note 1, at 47–49 (discussing applicability of
the Statute to oral promises of job security).
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12

ing the promise to be evidenced by a writing to be enforceable. On
the other hand, courts might construe the employer’s promise as
providing the employer or the employee with the right to terminate
the employment relationship within one year. In such cases, the contract might be considered capable of being performed within one
year of its formation and thus outside of the Statute.
Courts that have addressed these issues have reached conflicting
13
results. Essentially, the issue revolves around whether any retained
right by either the employee or the employer to terminate the employment relationship within one year of its formation means that the
contract can be performed within a year or alternatively, whether
such a right to terminate is considered either the defeasance of the
contract based on excusable nonperformance or cancellation based
14
on the other party’s breach. If it means the contract can be performed within one year, the Statute is not a bar; if the right to terminate the relationship is construed as either defeasance based on excusable nonperformance or cancellation based on breach, the Statute
15
renders the contract unenforceable.
This Article maintains that in “close” or “doubtful” cases, an
event that permits early termination of an employment contract
should be construed as excusable nonperformance instead of performance. Such an approach is consistent with the purpose of the
Statute’s one-year provision and the purpose of the employment-at-

12
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110(1)(e) (1981) (“The following
classes of contracts are subject to a statute, commonly called the Statute of Frauds,
forbidding enforcement unless there is a written memorandum or an applicable exception: . . . a contract that is not to be performed within one year from the making
therefore (the one-year provision).”).
13
See BALES, HIRSCH & SECUNDA, supra note 1, at 48 (“The statute of frauds is difficult to apply to employment cases, and courts (often within the same jurisdiction)
are inconsistent.”).
14
See id. (“Part of the problem derives from a longstanding disagreement over
the meaning of performance, termination, and excusable nonperformance.”).
If a court determines the parties intended the occurrence of the contingency to constitute full performance of the contract within one year
from the date of its making, that contract is enforceable under the statute of frauds. On the other hand, if the parties intended the occurrence of the contingency to terminate the contract, or failed to address
the contingency, that contract is not enforceable under the statute of
frauds.
Haroutunian, supra note 8, at 499.
15
As stated by three leading employment law commentators, the issue “derives
from a longstanding disagreement over the meaning of performance, termination,
and excusable nonperformance.” BALES, HIRSCH & SECUNDA, supra note 1, at 48.

OGORMAN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

ORAL PROMISES OF JOB SECURITY

6/22/2010 1:46 PM

1027

16

will doctrine. Part II of this Article provides a brief background on
the Statute of Frauds, including the history of its enactment, its purpose, and its treatment by the courts, with an emphasis on the Statute’s one-year provision. Part III discusses the employment-at-will
doctrine, with an emphasis on the likely reasons for its adoption.
Part IV reviews the leading decisions involving oral promises of job
security and the Statute. Part V sets forth the appropriate rules for
determining whether an oral promise of job security is unenforceable
17
under the Statute’s one-year provision.
II. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The history of the Statute begins with the state of English contract law before the seventeenth century. Originally, under English
18
common law, there was no general basis for enforcing promises. Rather, enforcement of a promise had to occur through one of the es19
tablished forms of action.
Several of the established forms of action could be used to enforce particular types of promises, but each had its limitations. The
20
writ of covenant, which arose near the end of the twelfth century
and which originally could be used at times to enforce informal
21
promises, was by 1321 restricted to promises made under seal.
The writ of detinue provided for the recovery of goods from one
who had obtained possession of them lawfully but who no longer had
22
the right to possess them. Detinue would presumably be available to
enforce a promise to deliver goods, provided title to them had passed

16

Professor Frank Vickory has argued that the Statute should be amended to
avoid the enforcement of oral promises of permanent employment. See Frank Vickory, The Erosion of the Employment-at-Will Doctrine and the Statute of Frauds: Time to Amend
the Statute, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 97, 119–20 (1992). The merits of such a proposal are
beyond the scope of this Article.
17
How the Statute should apply to oral promises of job security that are enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an issue beyond the scope of this
Article. Rather, this Article’s scope is limited to promises that are enforceable as part
of a bargained-for exchange.
18
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 11–12 (4th ed. 2004).
19
Id. at 12.
20
Id. at 13.
21
J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 318–19 (4th ed.
2002).
22
JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 110 (9th ed. 2008).
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to the promisee, but it could not be used to enforce promises gen24
erally.
The writ of debt enabled the recovery of a sum certain in money,
but only if the promisee had performed his side of the bargain and
25
thus given a benefit to the promisor. Also, a defendant in an action
of debt could avoid liability through so-called “wager of law,” which
permitted the defendant to avoid liability by having a number of
oath-helpers swear that the defendant was being truthful when he
26
denied the debt.
The writ of assumpsit could be used to recover loss to person or
property as a result of the promisor’s misfeasance in the performance
27
of a promised undertaking and thereafter was extended to econom28
ic losses caused by reliance on an unperformed promise. Near the
end of the sixteenth century, common-law courts extended assumpsit
even further, permitting its use to enforce unperformed promises
29
where there had been no reliance by the promisee. Thus, assumpsit
offered a form of action that could possibly provide a general theory
for enforcing promises. Also, an advantage of assumpsit was the
availability of a jury trial that, unlike debt, could not be defeated by
30
the defendant’s wager of law. Importantly, though, where an action
of debt was available, the plaintiff could not use assumpsit, and this
31
proved disadvantageous to creditors.
By the middle of the sixteenth century, however, assumpsit began making inroads on the use of debt. For example, by this time, an
action in assumpsit could be brought if a defendant who was already
indebted to the plaintiff made a subsequent promise to pay a particu32
lar sum. This form of action became known as indebitatus assumpsit, or “general assumpsit,” as distinguished from the older form of
33
assumpsit, which was known as “special assumpsit.” The death knell
for debt, and the triumph of assumpsit, finally came in 1602 as a re23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Id.
Id.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, at 13–14.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 17.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, at 17.
Id.
Id.
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34

sult of Slade’s Case. In that case, the court held that a debt alone,
without a subsequent express promise to pay the amount owed, could
35
support an action in general assumpsit. As a result, a creditor was
36
assured a jury trial, and the decision virtually put an end to the use
37
of wager of law. Because a judgment in assumpsit barred an action
of debt for the same amount and vice versa, “the action of debt on a
38
contract went almost out of use.” Slade’s Case thus had the beneficial
39
effect of unifying contract law through the action of assumpsit.
But there were downsides to unifying contract law through assumpsit. Whereas wager of law had protected defendants from fraudulent claims of debt, after Slade’s Case the only protection for defendants from such claims was the jury, and the jury, for a variety of
40
reasons, was not well-suited for this new task. For example, during
this period of English law, the jury was not entitled to the benefit of
41
the testimony of the parties or any interested person; juries, while
not familiar with the parties and the dispute, were also not the disin42
terested jurors of current times; and there was an undeveloped law
43
of evidence. As a result, there was “a distrust of the ability of juries
to determine the truth of conflicting testimony about the making of a

34

Slade’s Case, (1602) 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B.). For useful discussions of Slade’s
Case, see J. H. Baker, New Light on Slade’s Case, 29 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 51 (1971); David
Ibbetson, Sixteenth Century Contract Law: Slade’s Case in Context, 4 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 295 (1984); H. K. Lücke, Slade’s Case and the Origin of the Common Counts, 81 L.
Q. REV. 422 (1965); A. W. B. Simpson, The Place of Slade’s Case in the History of Contract, 74 L. Q. REV. 381 (1958).
35
FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, at 17.
36
Id. at 18.
37
BAKER, supra note 21, at 345; see also id. at 348 (“A direct consequence of Slade’s
Case was the complete replacement of wager of law by jury trial in disputed actions to
recover debts.”).
38
J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 286 (2d ed. 1979).
39
Id. at 287.
40
BAKER, supra note 21, at 348–49.
41
See BAKER, supra note 38, at 288–89 (“The parties themselves, and interested
persons, were excluded from the witness box at common law on the assumption that
their testimony would be biased and therefore worthless.”); Hugh Evander Willis, The
Statute of Frauds—A Legal Anachronism, 3 IND. L.J. 427, 430 (1928) (explaining that
when the Statute was enacted, “neither the parties to the action, nor their husbands
or wives, nor any person who had any interest in the result of the litigation, were
competent witnesses”).
42
James J. O’Connell, Jr., Comment, Boats Against the Current: The Courts and the
Statute of Frauds, 47 EMORY L.J. 253, 257 (1998).
43
Id.
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contract.” There was also a lack of judicial control over juries,
which included an inability to reverse verdicts contrary to the manif46
est weight of the evidence, and contract law was not well developed
47
at the time such that it could provide suitable guidance to the jury.
Defendants were perceived to be at a disadvantage and at risk of
48
having contractual liability when no contract was made. If wager of
law had resulted in perjury in favor of defendants, the use of assump49
sit resulted in perjury in favor of plaintiffs. During the “Restoration
50
period[,] the problem was keenly felt.” One jurist remarked in 1671
that two men could no longer talk together without one of them
51
claiming a promise had been made.
But it was too late to judicially change Slade’s Case, and thus a leg52
islative answer was sought. A return to wager of law was not seriously
pursued, but a writing requirement for certain types of promises appeared to be a convenient solution, which would be a partial return
53
to the law of covenant.

44

DAWSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 907.
See Willis, supra note 41, at 429 (“[T]he modern control of the court over the
jury, in the matter of the limits and elements of injury, the rules by which compensation for pecuniary injuries shall be ascertained, and in cases of passion and prejudice, was only just beginning.” (footnote omitted)).
46
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 63 (5th ed.
2000).
47
See Willis, supra note 41, at 431.
[A]t the time of the enactment [of the Statute,] the modern informal
contract law was in the making. The law of agreement, consideration,
conditions, illegality, etc., had not been fully worked out. The Statute
of Frauds was an attempt to cover a field now perhaps adequately covered by other topics. If our modern contract law had existed in the seventeenth century, there probably would have been no fourth and seventeenth sections of the Statute of Frauds at least.
Id.
48
O’Connell, supra note 42, at 255–56.
49
BAKER, supra note 21, at 349.
50
Id.
51
Id. It has been asserted that “the confusion attending the rapid succession of
Civil War, Cromwellian dictatorship, and Restoration . . . encouraged unscrupulous
litigants to pursue false or groundless claims with the help of manufactured evidence.” E. Rabel, The Statute of Frauds and Comparative Legal History, 63 L. Q. REV.
174, 174 (1947) (quoting G.C. CHESIRE & C.H. FIFOOT, LAW OF CONTRACT 106 (1946)
and citing LORD WRIGHT, LEGAL ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 225 (1939)).
52
BAKER, supra note 21, at 349.
53
Id.
45
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The legislative solution chosen was the Statute, which was
54
enacted in 1677 and entitled “An Act for the Prevention of Frauds
55
and Perjuries.” The Statute had two related goals: (1) protecting
56
defendants from perjury and (2) curbing the power of juries. The
only explicit statement of the Statute’s purpose was included in an introductory clause that provided as follows: “For prevention of many
fraudulent Practices which are commonly endeavored to be upheld
57
by Perjury and Subornation of Perjury Be[] it enacted . . . .”
Section 4 of the Statute identified the following five classes of
contracts that needed to be in writing to be enforceable: (1) “to
charge any Executor or Administrator upon any special[] promise to
answer[] damages out of his own[] Estate”; (2) “to charge the Defendant upon any special[] promise to answer[] for the debt default or
miscarriages of another person”; (3) “to charge any person upon any
agreement made upon consideration of Marriage”; (4) “any Contract
or Sale of Lands Tenements or Hereditaments or any Interest in or
concerning them”; and (5) “any Agreement that is not to be per-

54

The date of the Statute has been the subject of dispute, but 1677 is the date
that is now generally accepted. See George P. Costigan, Jr., The Date and Authorship of
the Statute of Frauds, 26 HARV. L. REV. 329, 341 (1913) (“[T]he Statute of Frauds was
finally passed and received the royal assent on April 16, 1677 . . . .”); Crawford D.
Hening, The Original Drafts of the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II c. 3) and Their Authors, 61
U. PA. L. REV. 283, 285 (1913) (“[T]he final draft of the bill, as passed by both houses
and assented to by the Crown, was not made until April 16, 1677 . . . .”); Willis, supra
note 41, at 427 (“There has been a difference of opinion among law writers as to the
date . . . of the Statute of Frauds; but it now seems to be settled that the correct date
for this celebrated Statute is April 16, 1677 . . . . ” (footnote omitted)).
55
An Act for the Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (Eng.);
see D & N Boening, Inc. v. Kirsch Beverages, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 992, 993 (N.Y. 1984)
(“The ancient Statute of Frauds is derived from the original English ‘Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries’ enacted in 1677 . . . .”).
56
Michael B. Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel’s Next Conquest?,
36 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1422–23 (1983); see also D & N Boening, Inc., 472 N.E.2d at 993
(“The entire Statute was intended to prevent fraud in the proving of certain legal
transactions particularly susceptible to deception, mistake and perjury . . . .”); Costigan, supra note 54, at 343–44 (noting that Professor James Bradley Thayer had surmised that the Statute was intended primarily to keep certain kinds of cases from juries, and stating that “[t]he judges who framed the Statute of Frauds were . . .
anxious to tie the hands of juries . . . .”); Willis, supra note 41, at 427 (“The original
purpose for the enactment of the statute of Frauds was to prevent fraud caused by
perjury; or in other words, to make it sure that legal effect should not be given to
transactions never entered into, and that parties should not be held on promises
never made.”).
57
An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (Eng.).
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formed within the space of one year[] from the mak[ing] thereof.”
Section 17 of the Statute required that certain contracts for the sale
59
of goods be in writing. It has been suggested that these classes of
contracts were chosen because these were “the groups of cases in
which the courts had encountered trouble because of uncertainty of
evidence and difficulty in ascertaining the scope of individual trans60
actions.”
It is not known for sure, however, why contracts that were not to
61
be performed within one year were included in the Statute, and the
62
provision’s purpose has baffled courts, lawyers, and historians. The
traditional explanation, and the one given by a jurist in 1697, was the
desire to not “trust to the memory of witnesses for a longer time than
63
one year.” The theory is that fraudulent claims could succeed in
these types of cases because the “memory of an agreement’s exact
terms and of the rights and responsibilities of its parties, availability of
witnesses, etc., all suffer when actions on oral contracts are stretched
64
out over several years.”
“[B]ecause these were continuing contracts—it might be very difficult to find any evidence at the time they

58

Id. § 4; see Jeffrey G. Steinberg, Promissory Estoppel as a Means of Defeating the Statute of Frauds, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 114, 114 (noting that “[o]f the original twenty-five
sections [of the Statute], only the fourth and seventeenth are important for contract
purposes”).
59
An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 17
(Eng.).
60
Rabel, supra note 51, at 184.
61
Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 77 (1974).
62
See Prof’l Bull Riders, Inc. v. AutoZone, Inc., 113 P.3d 757, 759 (Colo. 2005);
P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 208 (1979); see also C.R.
Klewin, Inc. v. Flagship Props., Inc., 600 A.2d 772, 775 (Conn. 1991) (noting that of
the Statute’s various provisions, the one-year provision “has caused the greatest puzzlement among commentators”).
63
Smith v. Westall, (1697) 91 Eng. Rep. 1106, 1107 (K.B.); see also Boydell v.
Drummond, (1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 958, 965 (1809) (K.B.) (Justice Bayley stating that
the purpose of the provision was to prevent “the leaving to memory the terms of a
contract for longer time than a year”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130
cmt. a (1981) (“The design was said to be not to trust to the memory of witnesses for
a longer time than one year . . . .”); 4 CAROLINE N. BROWN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 19.1, at 571 (Rev. ed. 1997) [hereinafter CORBIN] (“Where actions on contracts are
long delayed, injustice is likely to be done because of bad memory or because witnesses have died or moved away . . . [a]nd in the case of a contract whose performance is to cover a long period of time, actions are likely to be long delayed.”).”
64
O’Connell, supra note 42, at 286; see also Vickory, supra note 16, at 98–99 (“This
rule recognizes that since witnesses become unavailable and memories fade over
time, the possibility of enforcing fabricated verbal agreements increases with time.”).
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65

came to be enforced.” Under this theory, the one-year provision’s
purpose was consistent with the Statute’s overall purpose and was not
concerned with whether it was worthwhile to use the power of the
state to enforce a particular type of promise. Rather, it was concerned with whether a promise had been made at all.
But courts and commentators have noted that the one-year provision does not always effectuate the purpose of dealing with this
problem because there is no necessary relationship between the
length of time it takes to perform a contract, when the contract is
66
breached, and when a lawsuit is brought. For example, a long-term
contract might be breached soon after it is made and a lawsuit
brought soon thereafter. In such a situation, the time between the
making of the contract and the lawsuit would be short. In contrast, a
plaintiff might not bring suit on a short-term contract until just before the statute of limitations expires, and the time between the making of the contract and the lawsuit might therefore be long.
It is difficult to believe, however, that the Statute’s drafters did
not have in mind specific purposes for including the one-year provision, and it is likewise difficult to believe they would have drafted a
provision that did not effectively implement those purposes. As several commentators have noted, “The legislation certainly was not
concocted hastily. It was formally pending for more than four years
before its passage, went through numerous revisions, many of which
were substantial, and accumulated new clauses suggested by a variety
67
of legal experts of the time.”
P.S. Atiyah has suggested that
it seems . . . at least possible that [the one-year] provision was
simply designed to put an outer limit to the enforcing of executory contracts. A man might bind himself for the future if he

65

Willis, supra note 41, at 431.
See D & N Boening, Inc. v. Kirsch Beverages, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 992, 993 (N.Y.
1984); see also C.R. Klewin, Inc. v. Flagship Props., Inc., 600 A.2d 772, 776 (Conn.
1991) (“That explanation is, however, unpersuasive, since . . . the language of the
statute is ill suited to this purpose.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130
cmt. a (1981) (“The design was said to be not to trust to the memory of witnesses for
a longer time than one year, but the statutory language was not appropriate to carry
out that purpose. The result has been a tendency to construction narrowing the application of the statute.”); 4 CORBIN, supra note 63, § 19.1, at 578 (stating that “this
provision of the statute is . . . ill-supported by any sensible rationale”).
67
DAWSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 907.
66
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pleased, but, at least in the absence of writing, he was not to be
68
held bound to any performance due more than a year later.

But this theory—seemingly premised on a notion of government paternalism—suffers from the fact it would not fulfill the Statute’s purpose, which was aimed at fraudulent claims. Rather than being directed at whether a promise was made, it would be directed at
whether enforcing a particular promise was worthwhile.
Professor Joseph M. Perillo has proposed the following theory:
“It seems quite likely . . . that as in the case of other subdivisions the
draftsmen had in mind a transaction type: employment and similar
69
relationships, such as apprenticeships and fiduciary retainers.” Professor A.W.B. Simpson has also suggested that contracts of service
70
might have been the purpose of the one-year provision.
As he
notes, it is possible that the one-year provision was borrowed from
Scotland, which in the seventeenth century required proof by writ for
71
contracts of service for more than one year.
As discussed below, English common law presumed employment
to be for a term of one year. It makes sense that if a person sought to
establish a period of employment for more than the one-year presumption, he should be required to do so with a writing evidencing
the promise. If it is unusual for a particular promise to have been
made, more evidence than usual should be demanded to prove the
72
alleged promise. This theory would be consistent with the Statute’s
overall purpose and would be directed at determining whether a
promise had been made, rather than being directed at whether it is
worthwhile to enforce the particular type of promise. (Of course, this
theory could also be premised on the belief that it is not worthwhile
to enforce long-term employment and service contracts.) But as
noted by Professor Farnsworth, such a purpose is inconsistent with

68

ATIYAH, supra note 62, at 208.
Perillo, supra note 61, at 77 n.214.
70
See A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF
THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT 611–12 (paperback ed. 1987).
71
See id. at 612.
72
Courts in the United States often used this rationale to require “additional
consideration” (i.e., consideration other than the employee providing services to the
employer) to prove an employer’s alleged promise of job security. See Darlington v.
Gen. Elec., 504 A.2d 306, 314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (discussing “additional consideration” requirement and its use as an interpretation device), overruled on other grounds,
Krajsa v. Keypunch, Inc., 622 A.2d 355, 360 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
69
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the one-year period running from the date of the contract’s forma73
tion as opposed to the date performance is to begin.
Thus, we are left without a satisfactory explanation of the original purpose of the one-year provision, assuming we demand an explanation that is a perfect fit. At this point, one could simply abandon an attempt to explain the one-year provision’s purpose. Or,
accepting that no explanation will be a perfect fit, one could piece
together the most plausible explanation, taking into consideration
the various rationales that have been advanced for the Statute and
the one-year provision as well as other plausible explanations.
If the latter approach is adopted, the best interpretation of the
one-year provision’s purpose is that it was aimed primarily at employment and service contracts, and it was aimed at such contracts for
a variety of reasons, including that (1) it was unusual to have such an
arrangement in excess of one year; (2) it was often difficult to determine the truth in such cases since they were often brought long after
the alleged oral promise was made (i.e., when the employee or employer terminated the relationship after the typical one-year period
had elapsed); (3) the risk of error in such cases would be of particular concern because the remedy for a breach of a long-term contract
was likely to be substantial; and (4) it simply was not good policy to
hold a person to such a long-term contract, particularly when the
person had not reduced it to writing and thus perhaps not given it
the desired contemplation. These rationales give primacy to the Statute’s purpose of avoiding fraudulent claims (the first, second, and
third bases), but also include as a basis the belief that it is not worthwhile to enforce long-term oral employment contracts (the fourth basis).
I do not suggest that each member of Parliament who voted for
the Statute had in mind each of these rationales. Rather, I suggest
that most of the members likely had in mind employment or service
contracts and that most of the members had such contracts in mind
for one or more of the four reasons I have provided. Although the
one-year provision does not perfectly implement each of the rationales provided, it does a good job of providing a general rule to address the myriad of concerns raised. Although the one-year provision
might be both underinclusive and overinclusive with respect to the
concerns raised, so is any general rule.

73

FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, at 372–73.
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Each state in the United States has enacted its own version of the
Statute, with the exception of Louisiana, Maryland, and New Mexico,
and the latter two have held by judicial decision that the original Sta74
tute was received into the state. Although most of the Statute was
75
repealed in England in 1954, and despite the fact it has been criticized in the United States as an anachronism that promotes more
76
77
fraud than it prevents, the Statute remains part of our law. In fact,
most of the American statutes remain essentially the same as the orig78
inal 1677 Statute.
74

Id. at 354 & n.5; O’Connell, supra note 42, at 258 (noting that the Statute “has
been adopted, either by legislation or via judicial opinion, more or less intact by forty-nine states. Louisiana is the only exception.”). The current version of Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code requires that contracts for the sale of goods for the
price of $500 or more be evidenced by a writing. U.C.C. § 2-201. The current version of Article 2 has been adopted in every state except Louisiana. WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 46, at 4.
75
See O’Connell, supra note 42, at 259–60 (“[I]n 1954, Parliament repealed all of
the Statute except for the provision dealing with agreements to answer for the debt
of another and contracts for the sale of land. . . . [T]he English based this repeal, in
large part, on the theory that the Statute caused more fraud than it prevented.”
(footnote omitted)); see also Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 1954, 2 &
3 Eliz. 2, c. 34 (Eng.).
76
Willis, supra note 41, at 432; Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 779 F.2d
101, 106 (2d Cir. 1985).
Whatever may be the fact with regard to the history of the statute,
and whatever may have been the difficulties arising from proof that all
sides agree brought about the enactment of the statute of frauds over
300 years ago, it is an anachronism today. The reasons that prompted
its passage no longer exist. And, far from serving as a barrier to
fraud—in the case of a genuinely aggrieved plaintiff barred from enforcing an oral contract—the statute may actually shield fraud.
Id. at 106; see also Francis M. Burdick, A Statute for Promoting Fraud, 16 COLUM. L. REV.
273, 274 (1916) (noting that the Statute promotes more fraud than it prevents); Rabel, supra note 51, at 187 (“[T]he Statute essentially belongs to distant times, far removed from the conditions of modern life.”).
77
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, at 355 (“Statutes of frauds remain in this country despite their many critics.”); O’Connell, supra note 42, at 256 (“Not even the demise of the Statute in the nation of its birth has been enough to bring about its elimination in the United States because by the time its English parents saw fit to put it
down, the Statute had already placed one foot firmly in the mud on this side of the
Atlantic[,]” and has remained here by “hop[ping] regularly, if not always gracefully,
from state code to state code, from judicial opinion to judicial opinion.”) (quoting
James Fitzjames Stephen & Frederick Pollock, Section 17 of the Statute of Frauds, 1 L. Q.
Rev. 1, 6 (1885)); see also Steinberg, supra note 58, at 115 (“[T]he legislatures of virtually every state have maintained their individual statutes paralleling the English
original.”).
78
O’Connell, supra note 42, at 267; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 205 (3d ed. 2005) (“The states adopted the statute almost verbatim.”).
The proposed revisions to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code would only
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Despite the Statute’s vitality in the United States, courts have in79
terpreted the Statute narrowly, and this is particularly true with re80
spect to the one-year provision. One reason for this narrow interpretation of the one-year provision is because, as previously
mentioned, it does not always effectuate its traditionally stated pur81
pose.
Accordingly, following English precedent established well before
82
1776, courts have generally limited the provision to contracts that
83
cannot possibly be performed within one year, even if performance
84
within one year is unlikely. Thus, for example, “[c]ontracts of un85
certain duration are simply excluded . . . .” This rule does not, how-

require a writing for contracts for the sale of goods for the price of $5,000 or more.
U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (Proposed Amendments 2003).
79
FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, at 357.
80
Id. at 357 n.22 (citation omitted); 4 CORBIN, supra note 63, § 19.1, at 572 (“In
its actual application, the courts have perhaps been even less friendly to this provision than to the other provisions of the statute.”).
81
See supra note 66.
82
See Warner v. Tex. & Pac. Ry., 164 U.S. 418, 422–23 (1896).
It thus appears to have been the settled construction of this clause
of the statute in England, before the Declaration of Independence,
that an oral agreement which, according to the intention of the parties,
as shown by the terms of the contract, might be fully performed within
a year from the time it was made, was not within the statute, although
the time of its performance was uncertain, and might probably extend,
and be expected by the parties to extend, and did in fact extend,
beyond the year.
Id. In the first reported case in England dealing with the one-year provision, Lord
Holt seemed to suggest that the actual time for performance was the critical issue.
Francam v. Foster, (1692) 90 Eng. Rep. 912 (K.B.) (discussed in Warner, 164 U.S. at
421). But in Peter v. Compton, a case considered by all of the judges, the majority of
the judges concluded that a contract was only within the Statute if it was impossible
for it to be performed with one year. (1693) 90 Eng. Rep. 157, 157 (K.B.) (discussed
in Warner, 164 U.S. at 421–22).
83
D & N Boening, Inc., 472 N.E.2d at 993; see also Willis, supra note 41, at 439 (“As
interpreted by the courts this means any agreement that by its express terms cannot
possibly be performed, either by one or by both parties, within one year from the
making thereof . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see also Warner, 164 U.S. at 434 (“The
question is not what that probable, or expected, or actual performance of the contract was; but whether the contract, according to the reasonable interpretation of its
terms, required that it should not be performed within the year.”); 9 RICHARD A.
LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 24:3, at 450–56 (4th ed. 1999) [hereinafter
WILLISTON] (“A promise . . . is not within the Statute if at the time the contract is
made there is a possibility in law and in fact that full performance such as the parties
intended may be completed before the expiration of a year.” (footnote omitted)).
84
Deevy v. Porter, 95 A.2d 596, 597 (N.J. 1953).
85
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt. a (1981).
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ever, apply to performance by “abnormal and unusual methods not
within the contemplation of the parties” when they entered into the
86
contract. Also, “[d]espite prevailing views, one continues to find
courts who are prepared to ‘look to the circumstances’ and bring
within the statute oral agreements that might conceivably have been
87
performed within a year.” Further, the contract must be capable of
being performed within one year of its formation; thus, an employment contract for a one-year term, but which is to begin several days
88
after formation, is not capable of being performed within a year.
A promise of performance during the life of a particular person
is generally not within the Statute because the person might die with89
in a year of the contract’s formation. Similarly, “[a] promise of
permanent personal performance is, on a fair interpretation, a promise of performance for life, and therefore not within the Sta90
91
tute . . . .” Also, under the “great weight of authority,” “[i]f the
plaintiff’s part of the contract has been fully performed, the defendant’s part becomes enforceable without regard to the period cov92
ered.” Termination as a result of breach is not, however, the same
as termination by performance and will not constitute performance
93
within a year.
86

9 WILLISTON, supra note 83, § 24:4, at 466–70.
DAWSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 913; see also Great Hill Fill & Gravel, Inc. v.
Shapleigh, 692 A.2d 928, 929–30 (Me. 1997) (finding that the parties “plainly manifested” an intention for performance to last more than one year).
88
Kass v. Ronnie Jewelry, Inc., 371 A.2d 1060, 1061–62 (R.I. 1977).
89
9 WILLISTON, supra note 83, § 24:4, at 476–79.
90
Id. § 24:5, at 480.
91
4 CORBIN, supra note 63, § 19.14, at 617.
92
Id. § 19.1, at 578–79. This doctrine is different from the so-called “part performance” doctrine and renders the promise enforceable at law, not simply in equity.
Id. § 19.14, at 617. “Part performance not amounting to full performance on one
side does not in general take a contract out of the one-year provision.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt. e (1981). The application of the partperformance doctrine is therefore beyond the scope of this Article.
93
See D & N Boening, Inc. v. Kirsch Beverages, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 992, 995 (N.Y.
1984).
[T]he commentators have long agreed that the mere possibility of a
breach within the first year of an agreement does not constitute the
possibility of some alternative performance which would take the
agreement out of the Statute. Clearly, termination of an agreement as
a result of its breach is not performance thereof within the meaning of
the Statute of Frauds, and an oral agreement which by its own terms
must continue for more than a year unless terminated by its breach is
void.
Id. (citations omitted)
87
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The one-year provision was included in the First Restatement of
94
Contracts, published in 1932. The First Restatement provides that
the following contracts are unenforceable unless evidenced by a writing: “Bilateral contracts, so long as they are not fully performed by either party, which are not capable of performance within a year from
95
the time of their formation.” The First Restatement further provides that “[w]here any of the promises in a bilateral contract cannot
be fully performed within a year from the time of the formation of
the contract, all promises in the contract are within [the one-year
provision], unless and until one party to such a contract completely
96
performs what he has promised.”
Under the First Restatement,
97
promises in unilateral contracts are not within the one-year provision (such contracts being fully performed by one party at the time of
98
formation). The First Restatement further provides that “[t]he fact
that performance within a year is highly improbable or not expected
99
by the parties does not bring a contract within the Statute.” Importantly, the First Restatement states that “[a] distinction must be taken
between promises which can be ‘fully performed’ within a year and
promises which though they cannot be ‘fully performed’ within that
100
time may be excused within it by the happening of some event.”
The one-year provision was also included in the Second Res101
tatement of Contracts, published in 1981. The Second Restatement
essentially tracks the language of the First Restatement, providing
that “[w]here any promise in a contract cannot be fully performed
within a year from the time the contract is made, all promises in the
contract are within the Statute of Frauds until one party to the con102
tract completes his performance.”
The Second Restatement provides that “the provision covers only those contracts whose perfor103
It further
mance cannot possibly be completed within a year.”
94

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1932).
Id. A bilateral contract is one in which both parties to the contract have made
a promise. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 57 (6th ed.
2009) (“[A] contract where both parties have made promises is bilateral.”).
96
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 198 (1932).
97
A unilateral contract is one in which only one party has made a promise, and
the other party accepts the offer by performing. See PERILLO, supra note 95, at 56–57.
98
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 198(1) cmt. a (1932).
99
Id. cmt. b.
100
Id. cmt. c.
101
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110(1)(e) (1981).
102
Id. § 130(1).
103
Id. cmt. a.
95
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provides that where an agreement could be discharged by a power to
cancel or performance might be excused by supervening events, even
when such an event is identified in the contract as an excuse, such
104
occurrences are not considered performance.
The Second Restatement states that “[t]his distinction between performance and
excuse for nonperformance is sometimes tenuous; it depends on the
terms and the circumstances, particularly on whether the essential
105
purposes of the parties will be attained.”
Because the original grounds for enacting the Statute might no
longer exist (i.e., distrust of a jury’s ability to recognize perjury and a
court’s inability to control juries), commentators have sought to identify the reasons for its survival. Common arguments include (1) the
fact that a writing requirement promotes reflection by the parties before contracting (and presumably thereby increases the likelihood
that contracts will be value-enhancing to each party and thus worthy
106
of encouraging); (2) its use as a device for easily resolving disputes
involving important transactions (a concern with reducing litigation
expenses, which is a potential transaction cost associated with con107
tracting); (3) a way for courts to determine which agreements the
parties intended to be binding (promoting autonomy of the par108
ties); (4) a desire to encourage parties to reduce their agreements
to writing, because such agreements are easier for courts to interp109
ret, and the number and cost of trials will thereby be reduced
110
(transaction costs); (5) increased literacy rates (the elimination of a
111
basis for opposing a writing requirement); and (6) the modern developments of business, which include greater reliance on written
records (the elimination of a basis for opposing a writing require112
ment).
In addition, not surprisingly, continuing support for the
113
Statute has been based on the desire to prevent fraudulent claims.
104

Id.
Id.
106
FRIEDRICH KESSLER, GRANT GILMORE & ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, CONTRACTS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 756 (3d ed. 1986).
107
Id.
108
O’Connell, supra note 42, at 261.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 261–62 & 262 n.38.
111
Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?—An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704,
747 (1931).
112
Id.
113
See Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 779 F.2d 101, 118–19 (2d Cir. 1985)
(Wyatt, J., dissenting).
105
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Robert Braucher, the reporter for the Statute chapter of the Second
Restatement, noted that “a cautious approach to the Statute of Frauds
114
seems to be in harmony with American professional opinion.”
If one combines the likely reasons for the adoption in 1677 of
the one-year provision with the likely reasons for the Statute’s survival
in the United States, it can be concluded that the one-year provision
(and its survival) is based on avoiding the litigation expenses and the
risk of error involved in determining the truth of a party’s allegation
that he or she was given an oral promise of long-term employment,
along with a desire to insulate employers from long-term commitments that were perhaps not given serious consideration by the employer.
Most likely, those who dislike the Statute believe that it is used by
parties with superior bargaining power to deceive weaker parties with
impunity. Under this theory, the weaker party either fears that requesting a written agreement will cause the stronger party not to proceed with the proposed transaction, or the weaker party is unsophisticated and trusts the stronger party and therefore does not realize a
written promise should be secured. Then, when the weaker party
sues for breach of the oral promise, the stronger party escapes liability based on the Statute. The Statute does not have a negative effect
on stronger parties because their bargaining position and sophistication cause them to obtain written agreements when deemed advantageous to them (often through the use of form contracts). To persons
who hold this theory, oral promises by employers to employees with
respect to job security fit this description perfectly. Accordingly, the
Statute’s one-year provision is viewed as a pro-employer, pro-business
device to enable employers to deceive employees with impunity.

The Statute of Frauds does not seem to be an “anachronism” for
such cases as that at bar. The oral lifetime employment contract was
claimed by [the plaintiff] to have been made in a telephone conversation between him in California and [the defendant’s agent] in New
York. The conversation was not recorded; no memoranda were made.
The only testimony was, and could only be, that of [the plaintiff and
the defendant’s agent]. Not only was [the plaintiff] a witness hostile to
[the defendant, but so was the defendant’s agent, who had since been
terminated]. Thus, [the defendant] was at the mercy of [the plaintiff
and its former agent] in the sense that no person and no writing was
available to confirm or contradict them; they alone had made the
claimed oral contract and there was no writing.
Id.
114

Robert Braucher, The Commission and the Law of Contracts, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 696,
705 (1955).
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Those who support the Statute most likely believe that it prevents parties from fabricating oral promises and that it also precludes
enforcement of promises that in most instances would not be construed by reasonable persons as a commitment. With respect to the
former, persons who hold this view likely distrust the litigation
process as a means of arriving at the truth, and are probably particularly distrustful of the jury system. At least with respect to cases
brought by weaker parties against stronger parties, the jury might be
inclined to sympathize with the weaker party and therefore find the
existence of an oral promise even though the evidence is meager. I
suspect that persons who hold this view likely also believe that a person who fails to obtain a promise in writing has been negligent and
should pay the price for such carelessness. The risk of error in such
cases should be borne by the party whose fault it is that the evidence
is unclear. Also, one would expect that a party who had really been
made a promise within the Statute’s various categories would have secured it in writing.
With respect to the Statute rendering unenforceable promises
that in most instances would not be construed by reasonable persons
as a commitment, the Statute operates as a rule as opposed to a standard, eliminating the cost of litigating cases where it is likely that a
115
“promise,” as defined under contract law, has not even been made.
For example, if most promises for a long-term business (or employment) arrangement would not be construed as a binding commitment in the absence of a written promise, it makes sense (if one is
seeking to reduce litigation expenses) to render unenforceable all
oral assurances of a long-term arrangement.
Those who hold these views are likely to be businesses who distrust their chances in front of a jury, who believe responsible persons
reduce long-term and important commitments to writing, and who
desire to reduce litigation expenses because they are repeat players in
116
litigation.

115

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981) (“A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to
justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.”).
116
See STEVEN VAGO, LAW & SOCIETY 285–87 (8th ed. 2006) (discussing so-called
“repeat players” in litigation as opposed to so-called “one-shotters”).
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III. THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE
A. The Duration of Employment Relationships at English Common
Law
Under English common law, employment without an agreed
term was presumed to be for one year, and this rule applied to all
117
types of servants, though there were exceptions.
Blackstone asserted that the yearly hiring rule was based “upon a principle of natural equity, that the servant shall serve, and the master maintain him,
throughout all the revolutions of the respective seasons, as well when
118
there is work to be done as when there is not.” Thus, the rule prevented opportunism by precluding masters from discharging servants
after the planting season, and servants from quitting after the winter
119
season.
But the rule was not based solely on a concern for fairness between master and servant, and it was extended beyond agricultural
120
servants. Rather, the one-year presumption “was designed to compel labor and to control labor competition by restricting a worker’s
mobility for annual periods” and to “minimize[] parochial relief rates
by forcing the master to retain his servants during the months when
121
they were unlikely to find alternative employment.”
Accordingly,
the presumption was a default provision presumably based both on
what the parties would have agreed to had they considered the matter
(a provision to prevent opportunism by either party) and on economic reasons (compelling workers to work, restricting labor competi122
tion, and reducing parochial relief rates).
Interestingly, this one-year presumption (which for the previously stated reasons implied a long-term employment relationship)
would seem to conflict with the Statute’s one-year provision, which
was perhaps concerned with employees fabricating oral promises of
long-term employment. In fact, the one-year presumption would
seemingly render an oral employment contract unenforceable under
the Statute’s one-year provision, unless employment began imme117

Feinman, supra note 1, at 119–20; Summers, supra note 5, at 1082.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *413.
119
See Feinman, supra note 1, at 120; Bales, supra note 1, at 456.
120
See Feinman, supra note 1, at 120; Minda, supra note 3, at 968–69.
121
Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the United
States and England: An Historical Analysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L.J. 85, 90 (1982).
122
On filling gaps in contracts, see generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
118
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diately upon entering into the contract. Such seemingly inconsistent
purposes can be reconciled by concluding that one year was not considered a long term for an employment contract, but more than a
year was, particularly with respect to employment and service contracts, and by also concluding that such contracts were generally considered to be formed when services commenced (not sooner).
The one-year-employment rule was merely a presumption, and
123
the key issue was the parties’ intentions. Trade custom and the frequency of wage payments were important considerations in determining the parties’ intentions and, as a result, the term of employment
124
was often found to be less than a year.
A strong presumption remained, however, that the employment was for a specific term and
125
not on an at-will basis. An express agreement for an at-will relationship was necessary to rebut the presumption of employment for a de126
finite term, and an at-will relationship was considered an anomaly.
B. American Common Law Before the Late-Nineteenth Century
The history of how employment relationships were treated by
American courts has been the subject of extensive debate. In fact,
there is no consensus on how courts before the late-nineteenth century approached the issue.
Professor Jay Feinman has asserted that through the middle of
the nineteenth century, the law in the United States was not as clear
127
as English law.
As stated by Professor Sanford M. Jacoby,
“[d]ifferent courts might rule that an identical, indefinite contract
was either presumptively annual, terminable at will or terminable at
128
the end of a payment period.”
Professor Clyde Summers has also
recently asserted that “[b]y 1870, the law in the United States was
129
confused, with courts going in diverse directions.” In contrast, Professor Deborah Ballam has asserted that except for a brief time in the

123

Feinman, supra note 1, at 121; see also Summers, supra note 5, at 1082–83 (“This
presumption of a yearly hiring could be rebutted by facts showing a contrary intent
of the parties.”).
124
Summers, supra note 5, at 1083.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Feinman, supra note 1, at 122.
128
Jacoby, supra note 121, at 109.
129
Summers, supra note 3, at 67.
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130

colonies, employment-at-will was the norm. Professor Summers has
previously stated, however, that “[t]he English rule of presumed hir131
ing for a term was adopted by American courts . . . .”
C. Courts Adopt Wood’s Rule
To the extent that the law was confused, in the late-nineteenth
century the confusion started to lift. In 1877, an Albany lawyer and
treatise writer named Horace Gray Wood published a treatise on master and servant law, and in it he maintained that the United States inflexibly followed the employment-at-will rule. He stated,
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring
is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out
a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A
hiring at so much a day, week, month, or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it
was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the
party may serve. It is competent for either party to show what the
mutual understanding of the parties was in reference to the matter; but unless their understanding was mutual that the service
was to extend for a certain fixed and definite period, it is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either party, and in
this respect there is no distinction between domestic and other
132
servants.
133

Under what is now known as “Wood’s rule,” the employee had the
burden of proving a term of employment, thereby reversing any previous presumption that might have existed of employment for a defi134
nite term.
Although Wood had not intended a mechanical application of
135
the rule, the rule’s effect was to render most employment relation136
ships at will, instead of for a definite term. Thus, in the absence of

130
Deborah A. Ballam, Exploding the Original Myth Regarding Employment-at-Will: The
True Origins of the Doctrine, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 94 (1996).
131
Summers, supra note 5, at 1083.
132
HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT COVERING
THE RELATION, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES § 134, at 272
(1877) (footnotes omitted).
133
Minda, supra note 3, at 971.
134
Summers, supra note 5, at 1097; see also Jacoby, supra note 121, at 112 n.174
(“Wood placed the burden of proof on the employee since the hiring was ‘prima facie
a hiring at will.’”) (quoting WOOD, supra note 132, at 272).
135
Jacoby, supra note 121, at 112.
136
Summers, supra note 5, at 1097.
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sufficient evidence to rebut the at-will presumption, the rule required
137
a verdict for the employer. The rule also had “the effect of granting
employers absolute control and power over the employment relationship by transforming a relational or status relationship into a discrete
138
contract transaction.”
For the last several decades, commentators have debated whether Wood had support for his proposition and whether the cases he
139
cited in support were on point. Some have argued that his proposi140
tion was an “aberration” and an “unfounded generalization of exist141
Others have noted that in 1877 the at-will doctrine had
ing law.”
142
already been adopted by seven states, and another commentator
has asserted that the at-will doctrine was the norm throughout Amer143
ican history.
What is undisputed, however, is that by no later than the end of
the 1930s, employment-at-will was the prevailing rule in the United
144
States.
The rule was primarily adopted by courts as a matter of

137

Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment-at-Will Rule Revisited, 23 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 733, 736 (1991).
138
Minda, supra note 3, at 982.
139
Compare J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job
Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341 (1974) (no support), and Feinman, supra note 1, at
126 (no support), and Summers, supra note 5, at 1083 (no support), and Summers,
supra note 3, at 67 (“Wood’s Rule, by imposing a blanket presumption that all indefinite hirings were at will, misstated existing law.”), and Minda, supra note 3, at 970
(“Commentators now agree that Wood invented his own rule.”), with Ballam, supra
note 130, at 94 (“In actuality, with the exception of a brief period in early colonial
times, employment-at-will has been the norm in the United States. . . . The only latenineteenth century change was that some courts stopped interpreting fixed-term
agreements for payment of wages as an agreement to employ the worker for that
same term.”), and Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of
“Wood’s Rule” Revisited, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551, 552 (1990) (asserting that Wood’s citations supported his proposition).
140
Minda, supra note 3, at 982.
141
Summers, supra note 5, at 1097; see also St. Antoine, supra note 2, at 33 (asserting that the at-will rule “sprang full-blown in 1877 from the busy and perhaps careless
pen of an American treatise writer”).
142
Morriss, supra note 1, at 681.
143
Ballam, supra note 130, at 126.
144
See Bales, supra note 1, at 458, 460; Glendon & Lev, supra note 3, 457–58 (asserting that “by the end of the nineteenth century, nearly every American court had
formally adopted the at-will rule”); Summers, supra note 3, at 68 (“[B]y 1930, the
doctrine had become embedded in American law.”).
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145

common law, not by statute, and Wood’s rule was accepted by
146
147
courts uncritically and with little analysis.
Importantly, “a strong version of the [employment-at-will] rule
148
As applied by the courts, it was
came to be the dominant form.”
149
difficult for employees to rebut the at-will presumption, and courts
often refused to consider extraneous evidence of the parties’ inten150
tions.
Thus, the rule was often more of an irrebuttable presumption or a substantive rule of law that trumped the parties’ intentions
151
than a rebuttable presumption. In fact, the rule, as applied by the
152
courts, has been described as “virtually impermeable.”
Under this
strong version of the rule, even promises of “permanent” employ153
ment were presumed to be at will. Additional “superimposed spu154
rious doctrines,” such as mutuality of obligation, and the need for
the employee to provide additional consideration beyond his or her
155
services, strengthened the employment-at-will doctrine. One of the
results of the strong version of the at-will rule was that employment
termination cases based on an alleged breach of contract would rare156
ly be submitted to the jury.

145

Bales, supra note 1, at 460.
Minda, supra note 3, at 986.
147
See Bales, supra note 1, at 460; Morriss, supra note 1, at 697; Summers, supra
note 3, at 68; Shapiro & Tune, supra note 139, at 342.
148
Morriss, supra note 1, at 763.
149
Feinman, supra note 1, at 129.
150
Jacoby, supra note 121, at 116. Professor Feinman has argued that “Wood’s
rule represented a signal to the courts to view skeptically employees’ evidence of contracts of long duration.” Feinman, supra note 137, at 736.
151
Summers, supra note 5, at 1097; Summers, supra note 3, at 69.
152
Bales, supra note 1, at 461.
153
Summers, supra note 5, at 1097 n.66; see also Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co.,
266 N.W. 872 (Minn. 1936) (holding that the words “permanent employment” imply
at-will relationship); Jacoby, supra note 121, at 117 (“The courts in most jurisdictions
after 1890 held that contracts for ‘permanent’ or ‘lifetime’ employment were indefinite as to duration and thus terminable at will.”).
154
Summers, supra note 5, at 1099.
155
Id. at 1097–99; see also Minda, supra note 3, at 963 (“The current rule of employment at-will is frequently defended on the principle of mutuality of obligations.
If the employee can quit the relationship at any time and for any reason, it is argued,
then the employer must be granted the mutual right of contract termination.”);
Freed & Polsby, supra note 139, at 558 (noting that courts “applied the contract principles of consideration and mutuality to conclude that an employee was not entitled
to job security under an indefinite contract”).
156
Morriss, supra note 1, at 683.
146
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D. The Reasons for the Success of Wood’s Rule in the United States
Commentators disagree on why the employment-at-will rule succeeded in the United States. Some commentators have asserted that
part of the reason the rule succeeded might have been because it was
announced in “a modern, comprehensive treatise,” and it was “a clear
157
rule of practical application . . . .” As one commentator stated, “the
judicial adoption of the rule reflected the benefits to judges of a simple, clear rule which was consistent with the contemporary style of le158
gal analysis.”
Other commentators have asserted the employment-at-will rule
spread as part of the courts’ implementation of the general theory of
contract developed by Christopher Columbus Langdell, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Samuel Williston in the late-nineteenth and ear159
ly-twentieth centuries.
The foundation of this general theory of
contract was the freedom of the parties to structure their relationship
160
as they saw fit. This general theory was an abstraction, and under it
161
the contract’s subject matter should be irrelevant.
As Professor Feinman has noted, though, the employment-at-will
doctrine, at least as applied by the courts, was a rejection of this general theory of contract:
The employment at will rule represent[ed] . . . a departure [from
the general theory of contract] because the courts did not deal

157

Feinman, supra note 1, at 127.
Morriss, supra note 1, at 682.
159
See Bales, supra note 1, at 454 (“The prevailing wisdom is that the at-will rule
spread because of a judiciary fixated, from about 1890 to 1930, on laissez-faire reasoning and freedom of contract.”); Freed & Polsby, supra note 139, at 558 (“Several
courts identified freedom of contract as the predominant policy reason for employment at will . . . .”); Jacoby, supra note 121, at 116 (“Perhaps the most common explanation for the courts’ embrace of the at will doctrine was the rise of a formalistic
approach to contract interpretation.”); James A. Sonne, Firing Thoreau: Conscience and
At-Will Employment, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 235, 235 (2007) (stating that the doctrine is “[r]ooted in freedom of contract and private property principles”); see also
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 6 (1974) (“[T]he idea that there was such
a thing as a general law—or theory—of contract seems never to have occurred to the
legal mind until Langdell somehow stumbled across it. It remained, of course, for
Langdell’s successors [such as Holmes and Williston] to organize the great discovery,
to map its outlines, and to plot its contours.”); Minda, supra note 3, at 977 (“By 1913,
the contract justification for Wood’s Rule was accepted in New York and elsewhere as
the general rationale governing at-will employment contracts.”).
160
Feinman, supra note 1, at 124–25; Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract
Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1286 (1990).
161
See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 20–24 (1965); Feinman,
supra note 1, at 125.
158
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with the issue as a matter of pure doctrine; the fact that an employment contract was at stake made all the difference in the
shaping of the law. If the law on duration of service contracts had
followed the teachings of pure contract theory, the agreement established by the parties would have been enforced. Thus the duration of hiring and the notice required would have been open
questions in each case to be decided without presumptions of either yearly hiring or termination at will. The period of payment
and the business customs of which the parties would have been
cognizant would be important factors . . . . But the contract approach was never implemented because of the rise of employ162
ment at will.

Professor Summers concurs: “The employment at will doctrine is cast
in contract language, but it has no basis in contract law. The courts
have not asked the basic contract question—what did the parties in163
tend?” Professor Feinman has also noted that it is unlikely that the
spread of Wood’s rule was because employees and employers generally presumed their relationships to be at will, pointing out that the
rule was developed in response to cases brought by mid-level employees, relationships under which both employee and employer
164
would have expected some degree of permanence.
The most common explanation for the rise of the employmentat-will doctrine is the effect of economic factors. Professor Ballam,
who maintains that the employment-at-will rule was adopted in co165
lonial times, believes the English yearly hiring rule did not take
hold in the colonies because most laborers were occasional or day laborers, indentured servants, or slaves to whom the yearly hiring rule
166
was inapplicable.
Also, a shortage of labor increased wages, and
employers could generally not afford to be bound by a yearly hir167
ing.
Further, most employers were small subsistence farmers who
did not need permanent help, and the free laborers would not want
to be bound for a year because they simply wanted to earn enough
162

Feinman, supra note 1, at 125.
Summers, supra note 5, at 1099.
164
Feinman, supra note 1, at 131–32; see also John Blackburn, Restricted Employer
Discharge Rights: A Changing Conception of Employment at Will, 17 AM. BUS. L.J. 467, 482
(1980) (asserting that the probable intent of employees and employers is that the
employee will not be terminated without good cause); Summers, supra note 5, at
1097 (“The new presumption was not based on any finding, or even assertion, that it
expressed the way the parties in fact viewed their relationship.”).
165
Ballam, supra note 130, at 129.
166
Id. at 127.
167
Id.
163
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money to buy their own land, which would not take long because
168
land was cheap.
Other commentators, most notably Professor Feinman, have
taken the position that the rise of the employment-at-will doctrine
169
was a result of the development of advanced capitalism. He maintains that the essential elements of advanced capitalism include an
owner’s freedom to terminate employees and a division between capi170
tal and labor.
He asserts that the rule succeeded because “judges
were conservative people, trained in an environment that exalted the
values of business,” and “Wood’s rule served the purposes of the
171
owners of capital.” He maintains that the rule was “the ultimate guarantor of the capitalist’s authority over the worker. . . . If employees
could be dismissed on a moment’s notice, obviously they could not
claim a voice in the determination of the conditions of work or the
172
use of the product of their labor.” Also, the combination of severe
business cycles, which were common in the late-nineteenth century,
and the rule that permitted terminations without notice placed the
173
burden of these cycles on employees, not the owners.
Other commentators have similarly asserted that economic factors were responsible for the employment-at-will doctrine’s spread.
For example, two student authors argued in an influential student
note that the spread was due to ideological conviction, namely a desire to support “freedom of enterprise, which was considered to include the ‘fundamental right’ of the employer to discharge em174
ployees as he or she pleased.” Professor Jacoby has argued that the
employment-at-will rule spread because trade unions were weak in
the United States and could not secure a better rule from the courts,
and the rule was applied to white-collar workers because they were
not perceived as particularly higher in status than blue-collar work175
ers. Professor Summers argued,

168

Id. at 127–28.
See Feinman, supra note 1, at 131; see also St. Antoine, supra note 2, at 33 (stating that Wood’s “pronouncement was admirably suited to the zeitgeist of an emerging
industrial nation”).
170
Feinman, supra note 1, at 134.
171
Id. at 135.
172
Id. at 132–33.
173
Id. at 134.
174
Shapiro & Tune, supra note 139, at 343 (footnote omitted).
175
Jacoby, supra note 121, at 119–26.
169
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The assumption is that the employee is only a supplier of labor
who has no legal interest or stake in the enterprise other than the
right to be paid for labor performed. The employer, as owner of
the enterprise, is legally endowed with the sole right to determine
176
all matters concerning the operation of the enterprise.

Professor Richard Bales recently argued that once a handful of
under-industrialized states adopted the rule, “other such states would
have felt economic pressure to follow suit to avoid being left behind
in attracting capital. The industrialized states would then have felt
similar pressure to adopt the rule to maintain their competitive ad177
vantage in the labor market.”
Professors Mayer Freed and Daniel Polsby argued that “[t]he
employment-at-will rule was the natural offspring of a capitalist economic order, reflecting the value of individualism, the growth of
178
competition and the mobility of labor.” Professors Mary Ann Glendon and Edward R. Lev similarly asserted that the doctrine “was high179
Professor
ly compatible with prevailing laissez-faire notions . . . .”
Summers noted, however, that “a principle of limited government intervention can not explain why one presumption rather than another
is to be imposed; neutral interpretation of the parties’ intent would
180
be more appropriate to laissez faire.”
Professor Gary Minda argued that by the early-nineteenth century, employment contracts “became ‘fused’ with master-servant concepts, which emphasized the importance of a servant’s loyalty to his
master, the need for authoritarian control, and the idea that the em181
ployment relation must serve the needs of the enterprise.”
He argued that although the master-servant relationship originated in con182
tract, it was considered a legal status.
It has also been suggested,
however, that “in its day the [at-will] rule could be seen as a ‘progres-

176

Summers, supra note 3, at 65.
Bales, supra note 1, at 465.
178
Freed & Polsby, supra note 139, at 558.
179
Glendon & Lev, supra note 3, at 458; see also Sonne, supra note 159, at 243
(“[T]here is no question its opposition to the English presumption of one-year hiring captured the laissez-faire spirit of both the legal and business cultures of the time
. . . .” (footnote omitted)).
180
Summers, supra note 3, at 68.
181
Minda, supra note 3, at 986.
182
Id.
177
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sive reaction to the status concepts’ that had governed the employ183
ment relation in the past.”
Professor Andrew P. Morriss argued that the rise of the at-will
184
rule was not the result of industrialization or judicial class preju185
He based his conclusion on the fact that the first states to
dice.
adopt the at-will rule were in the under-industrialized West and
186
South. Thus, he concluded that the rule was adopted to keep such
disputes out of the courts because of courts’ limited capacity “to evaluate evidence concerning performance by white collar, skilled em187
ployees.”
In sum, it is likely that the spread of the at-will rule, like the
adoption of the Statute’s one-year provision, was the result of multiple factors, including (1) notions of autonomy and freedom of contract (in the sense that a failure to agree on job security means an absence of consent to anything other than an at-will relationship); (2) a
desire to retain employer and employee flexibility in order to promote wealth maximization (with the parties retaining the right to discontinue the relationship if it became unprofitable for one of the
parties, or a more profitable alternative became available); and (3) a
desire to keep out of the court system cases that are difficult from an
evidentiary standpoint.
E. The Employment-at-Will Rule in Modern Times
The so-called “strong version” of the at-will doctrine remained
188
common through the 1950s.
Starting in the late 1950s, however,
189
Some courts
exceptions to the at-will doctrine began to arise.
sought to move toward pure contract theory and return Wood’s rule
to its original intent, which was as a rebuttable presumption of at-will
status, and to make use of implied-in-fact contracts and reliance to
190
render promises of job security enforceable.
For example, courts
today are more likely to enforce promises of job security made orally

183
Glendon & Lev, supra note 3, at 458 (quoting Daniel A. Mathews, Note, A
Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1438
(1975)).
184
See Morriss, supra note 1, at 681.
185
See id. at 682.
186
See id. at 701.
187
Id. at 762.
188
Bales, supra note 1, at 458.
189
Id. at 459.
190
Minda, supra note 3, at 951.
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191

or in employment handbooks.
But “[t]his approach has not provided a major exception to the common law rule because courts have
narrowly defined the facts and circumstances needed to rebut the
192
normal presumption that employment is terminable at will.”
Courts have also created a “public policy exception” to the at-will
doctrine, under which tort claims are recognized for terminations of
employment that are detrimental to a clearly articulated public poli193
cy. However, “courts frequently require that the discharge actually
violate some clear and specific statement of public policy found within state law. Hence, unless some specific statutory provision has been
violated, most courts have refused to apply the public policy excep194
tion to the common law rule.”
Some courts have also recognized
an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the em195
ployment-at-will relationship, but most courts have rejected this ap196
proach. Congress and the state legislatures have created numerous
statutory exceptions, including prohibitions on terminations based
197
on protected characteristics such as race and sex, or based on un198
199
ion activity or whistle blowing to name just a few.
But importantly, the exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine have not fundamentally altered the rule itself. The exceptions
generally apply to a termination for a specific, improper reason and
do not create a general “good cause” or “just cause” requirement for
terminations, like those that exist in most collective bargaining
agreements. For employees who have been terminated because they
allegedly did not perform well, or allegedly broke a workplace rule,
the at-will rule will apply, and there will generally be no claim for
wrongful termination.
One commentator recently recognized, “[D]espite these restrictions on employer discretion, the employee protections are exceptions that coexist with the rule of at-will employment. For the most

191

Bales, supra note 1, at 459.
Minda, supra note 3, at 951.
193
Id. at 951–52.
194
Id. at 952.
195
Id.
196
Id. at 953.
197
See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(2006).
198
See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006).
199
See, e.g., Whistleblower Law, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1421–1428 (West
2009).
192
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part, employers still retain broad firing discretion.”
As stated by
Professor Summers, “[t]he exceptions were narrowly restricted
and . . . [t]he employer’s divine right to dismiss at any time, for any
201
reason, and without notice has survived with vigor.”
The employment-at-will “doctrine has been, and still is, a basic premise under202
girding American labor law.” Professor Summers stated,
What has emerged is that judicially created exceptions to the rigid employment at will doctrine, which had the potential for providing employees, especially long time employees, with substantial
protection from unfair dismissals, have been so grudgingly applied by most courts, that they are little more than paper shields
against arbitrary employer actions. The dominant judicial perspective is that employers should have unfettered freedom to determine who should be employed and that workers are subordinate to the employer’s decisions—however arbitrary they may
203
be.

As one commentator has recently noted, “[w]hat recent years have
204
not seen . . . is the long-predicted death of employment at will.”
Summers has argued that the employment-at-will rule continues to
“draw[] its strength from the deeply rooted conception of the employment relation as a dominant-servient relation rather than one of
mutual rights and obligations. The employer, as owner of the enterprise, is viewed as owning the job with a property right to control the
205
job and the worker . . . .”
IV. CASES INVOLVING THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
TO ORAL PROMISES OF JOB SECURITY
Courts that have addressed the application of the Statute’s oneyear provision to oral promises of job security have reached conflicting results as to whether the Statute bars the enforcement of such
206
promises.
Of course, “[t]he general rule, almost universally ad-

200

Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Employment
Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73, 79 (2007).
201
Summers, supra note 3, at 73.
202
Id. at 65.
203
Id. at 77.
204
Scott A. Moss, Where There’s At-Will, There Are Many Ways: Redressing the Increasing
Incoherence of Employment at Will, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 295, 300 (2005) (emphasis added).
205
Summers, supra note 3, at 78.
206
See BALES, HIRSCH & SECUNDA, supra note 1, at 48 (“The statute of frauds is difficult to apply to employment cases, and courts (often within the same jurisdiction)
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hered to, is that a contract for personal services which by its terms is
207
not to be performed within a year must be in writing.”
Thus, an
oral employment contract under which an employer and an employee each promise an employment relationship for a definite term
to last more than one year from the contract’s formation is without
question barred by the Statute if there is no possibility of early termi208
nation other than as a result of a total material breach.
But alleged oral promises of job security are not always bilateral
contracts under which an employer and an employee each agree to a
definite term of employment, subject only to early termination as a
209
result of a party’s total material breach. For example, an employer
might promise employment for a specific duration, but the employee
210
might retain the right to quit at any time. Or an employer’s promise of a definite term of employment might be construed as including
the right of the employer to terminate the relationship within a year
for reasons other than the employee’s total material breach. For example, even without an explicit right to terminate the employment
relationship during the term of employment, an employer generally
has an implied-in-fact right to terminate the relationship for “just
211
cause.” Or either party might retain the right to terminate the con-

are inconsistent.”); JEFFREY FERRIELL & MICHAEL NAVIN, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS
301 (2004) (“Such long term contracts have been viewed in conflicting ways, with
some courts treating ‘termination’ as an excuse, similar to death, and others treating
termination as a means of alternative performance.” (footnote omitted)).
207
French v. Sabey Corp., 951 P.2d 260, 262 (Wash. 1998).
208
See, e.g., Trum v. Melvin Pierce Marine Coating, Inc., 562 So. 2d 235 (Ala.
1990) (oral employment contract for four years); Richard A. Naso & Assocs. v. Diffusion, 390 S.E.2d 106, 108 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (oral employment contract for five
years); Cunnison v. Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc., 485 N.Y.S.2d 272, 274 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1985) (oral employment contract for five years); Garg v. Venkataraman,
561 N.E.2d 1005, 1008 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (oral employment agreement for ten
years); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt. b, illus. 5 (1981) (oral employment contract for five years); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 198 cmt. d,
illus. 3 (1932) (oral employment contract for thirteen months); 9 WILLISTON, supra
note 83, § 24.1, at 438 (“A contract to serve for a period extending more than a year
beyond the time of making the contract is uniformly held within the Statute.”). A
party has a right to terminate or cancel a contract in response to a “total material
breach” by the other party. FERRIEL & NAVIN, supra note 206, at 450. A “total material breach” is a material breach if it “cannot be cured or if a reasonable time for cure
has expired.” Id.
209
In fact, one would think that most agreements of this kind would be in writing.
210
See, e.g., Deevy v. Porter, 95 A.2d 596, 596 (N.J. 1953) (agreement for one-year
employment term, subject to the right of the employee to quit at any time).
211
Short v. Columbus Rubber & Gasket Co., Inc., 535 So. 2d 61, 66 (Miss. 1988)
(citing Masonite Corp. v. Handshoe, 44 So. 2d 41, 43 (Miss. 1950)). As stated by one
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212

tract upon a certain amount of notice.
Or an employer might
promise employment not for a definite term, but for as long as the
213
employee is performing satisfactorily. In such cases, the application
of the Statute becomes complicated.
In these cases, the question is whether “performance” can occur
within one year as a result of the right to terminate the employment
relationship. The answer to this question depends on the characterization of the event that permits termination within a year. If the
event is a breach or an excuse for nonperformance, the contract is
214
within the Statute. But if performance has already occurred by the
time of the event (or if the event is itself the completion of performance or the equivalent of full performance), it is not within the Sta215
tute.
As discussed below, some courts construe “performance” narrowly and hold that if the parties intended an employment relationship
for longer than one year from the contract’s formation, a right by either party to terminate the relationship sooner is not a defense to the
Statute “because although defeasance is possible within a year perfor216
Other courts, however, view “performance” more
mance is not.”
broadly and hold that such a right to early termination takes the con217
tract out of the Statute’s one-year provision.
court, under an employment contract, it is assumed that the parties intended for the
employee to “conform to the usual standards expected of an employee, and that he
would render honest, faithful and loyal service in accordance with his ability. If there
is a willful and substantial failure to adhere to those standards it would be justifiable
cause for the employer to discharge him.” Chiodo v. Gen. Waterworks Corp., 413
P.2d 891, 892 (Utah 1966) (footnote omitted).
212
See, e.g., French v. Sabey Corp., 951 P.2d 260, 261 (Wash. 1998) (five-year employment contract that could be terminated upon six months’ notice).
213
See, e.g., Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 779 F.2d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1985)
(promise of permanent employment as long as the employee did not “screw[] up
badly,” though majority construed the promise as one giving the employer the right
to terminate for “just cause”); Hetes v. Schefman & Miller Law Office, 393 N.W.2d
577, 577 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (alleged promise to employ plaintiff as long as she
did “a good job”).
214
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130(1) & cmt. a (1981).
215
Id. § 130.
216
PERILLO, supra note 95, at 668.
217
Id. at 669. Interestingly, New York has a “peculiar variation” on the rule. Id.
Under the New York rule, “the Statute does not apply if the option to terminate is
bilateral or if the option is in the defendant, but the Statute would be a defense if the
option of termination is only in the plaintiff.” Id. For example, in Harris v. Home Indemnity Co., the court refused to enforce an oral promise of permanent employment
“where the right to cancel or terminate is limited unilaterally to plaintiff.” 175
N.Y.S.2d 603, 603 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958). The court’s rationale was that “in such cases
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A. Courts Construing “Performance” Narrowly
Perhaps the leading case finding that exercising the right to
terminate the employment relationship within a year is not “perfor218
mance” is Deevy v. Porter, decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court
in 1953. In Deevy, the plaintiff, as assignee of a claim, alleged that the
defendants promised to employ the assignors (a husband and wife)
for one year, with employment to start at some point after the con219
tract was made, but that the employees “could quit at any time.”
Even though the employees could quit at any time, the court held
that the agreement was within the Statute because “the parties bargained for a fixed-term employment agreement not to be performed
220
within one year from its making,” and that “the employees’ promise, as allegedly given, could likewise not be fully performed within
the year, even though upon the exercise of their option to ‘quit at
221
any time’ nonperformance thereafter would legally be excused.”
The court, with little elaboration or analysis, presumed that the
employees had made promises to work for a year, and that if the employees quit before that time, they would have failed to perform,
though it would not have been a breach but excusable nonperfor222
mance. The court relied on cases holding that an option to terminate a contract at the will of a party was the equivalent of rescission,
223
not performance.
As stated by one court, even though the employee has the right to terminate the relationship within one year, “it
is significant that the agreement establishes a contemplated term,
and the plaintiff’s departure would cut that term short, thereby fru224
strating the intent of the contract.”

defendant’s liability endures indefinitely, subject only to the uncontrolled voluntary
act of the party who seeks to hold defendant. Under such circumstances it is illusory,
from the point of view of defendant, to consider the contract terminable or performable within one year.” Id. The court then noted that “it is to the party to be charged,
alone, namely the defendant, that the statute is designed to provide protection from
fraud and perjury.” Id.
218
95 A.2d 596 (N.J. 1953).
219
Id. at 596.
220
Id. at 598–99.
221
Id. at 599.
222
Id.
223
See id. at 598 (citing Wagniere v. Dunnell, 73 A. 309, 310 (R.I. 1909)).
224
Lamaster v. Chi. & Ne. Ill. Dist. Council, 766 F. Supp. 1497, 1508 (N.D. Ill.
1991).
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Another leading decision adopting a similar view is the 1959 U.S.
225
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit decision in Coan v. Orsinger.
In Coan, the plaintiff alleged that he was orally promised the job of
resident manager of an apartment development, and that the job was
to last until he completed law school (which he had just started) or
226
until he was obliged to discontinue those studies.
A little over a
227
The majority held that the plainmonth later he was terminated.
tiff’s claim was barred by the Statute, despite the plaintiff’s argument
that the contract could be completed within one year since he might
be obliged to discontinue his law studies because of poor grades or
228
other reasons. The majority reasoned as follows:
That contingency contemplates an annulment of the terms of
the contract and would operate as a defeasance, thereby terminating and discharging the contract. Further performance under
the contract would be impossible by either party. This annulment
or defeasance provision does not contemplate the performance of
the contract but only its termination and cancellation. Although
it could be annulled within a year, it was none the less a personal
service contract to last for more than a year, e.g., until appellant
completed his studies at Georgetown University Law School. Although this annulment or defeasance provision relieves the parties from further performance of the contract, it is not the type of
performance that is necessary to take the case out of the operation
of the statute.
....
The courts . . . recognize a distinct difference between a contingency which fulfills the terms of a contract and one which prevents fulfillment. If the contingency which fulfills and completes
the terms of the contract happens or could possibly happen within a year, the contract is not within the statute. On the other
hand, if the contingency prevents or discharges the parties from
performing their obligations under the contract within a year,
229
then the contract is within the statute.

The court then concluded that the contract was for personal services
in excess of a year, subject to the right to annulment that might occur
230
sooner.
The court held that “this in no way helps to further the

225
226
227
228
229
230

265 F.2d 575.
Id. at 575–76.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 576–77.
Id. at 577, 578.
Id.
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performance of the contract but rather serves to defeat it, rendering
performance impossible, and thus bringing the contract within the
231
statute.”
The dissent argued that the contract provided for two alternative
methods of performance. The dissent asserted that “[t]he contract
called for performance until appellant ‘was obliged to discontinue’
his studies. This contingency did not defeat the contract; it simply
232
advanced a basis upon which it could be carried out.”
In French v. Sabey Corp., the Washington Supreme Court addressed whether an employment contract for a five-year term, but
with the right of either party to terminate the employment relation233
ship on six months’ notice, was within the Statute. The court ruled
that the contract was barred by the Statute because the right to terminate on six months notice would constitute the defeasance of the
234
contract, not its performance.
Courts have also held that an employer’s right to terminate the
employment relationship for cause constitutes a termination as a result of a breach, and the contract therefore remains within the Statute. For example, in Haigh v. Matsushita Electric Corp., the plaintiff
alleged that he had been orally promised employment until he re235
tired (which would be in twenty-one years). The court held that a
termination for cause would result from the employee breaching his
promise to render satisfactory service, and was therefore not perfor236
mance.
Similarly, in Windsor v. Aegis Services, Ltd., the plaintiff alleged
that his supervisor orally promised him that he would have “a job as
long as he did not violate the standards of conduct noted in an em237
ployee handbook given to [him] after he began his employment.”
After the plaintiff’s employer terminated him, he filed suit for wrongful termination, asserting that his employer terminated him without
238
just cause.
The district court granted the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, holding that the Statute barred the oral promise
231

Coan, 265 F.2d at 578.
Id. at 580 (Danaher, J., dissenting).
233
French v. Sabey Corp., 951 P.2d 260, 261 (Wash. 1998).
234
Id. at 263.
235
Haigh v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 676 F. Supp. 1332, 1346 (E.D. Va. 1987).
236
Id. at 1348.
237
Windsor v. Aegis Servs., Ltd., 691 F. Supp. 956, 957 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff’d, 869
F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1989).
238
Id. at 956–57.
232
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because it could not be performed within one year. The court concluded that termination of the employment relationship for violating
240
the standards of conduct does not constitute performance.
The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed on the basis of
241
the district court’s reasoning.
These courts adopt a narrow interpretation of “performance,”
concluding that a right to terminate the employment relationship
within a year is either the defeasance of the contract or the right to
cancel based on a total material breach. Under such an approach,
courts have little difficulty concluding that the Statute bars the oral
promise.
B. Courts Construing “Performance” Broadly
The other view treats an option to terminate within a year as an
alternative method of performance. For example, in Fothergill v.
McKay Press, the court strongly suggested that the Statute would pose
no bar to an oral employment contract providing for five years’ em242
ployment but terminable by either party upon six months’ notice.
In Taylor v. Canteen Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that “[w]here . . . the promise of employment is cast in
terms of lasting as long as the employee wants the job, the promise is
capable of performance within one year and thus outside the Illinois
243
Statute of Frauds.”
Courts have also held that an employer’s right to terminate the
employment relationship for “just cause” includes the right to terminate for reasons other than the employee’s breach. The leading decision adopting this approach is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
244
Second Circuit decision in Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.
In Ohanian, the plaintiff alleged that the employer orally prom245
ised him that he would not be fired “unless [he] screwed up badly.”
After the employer fired the plaintiff, the plaintiff brought suit for
246
breach of the alleged oral promise, and the defendant argued that

239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246

Id.
Id. at 960.
Windsor v. Aegis Servs., Inc., 869 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1989).
Fothergill v. McKay Press, 106 N.W.2d 215, 220 (Mich. 1960).
Taylor v. Canteen Corp., 69 F.3d 773, 785 (7th Cir 1995).
779 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying New York law).
Id. at 104 (alteration in original).
Id.
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247

the Statute’s one-year provision barred the suit.
Importantly, the
court construed the promise as permitting the employer to terminate
248
the employee for “just cause” rather than for “screwing up badly.”
The court then concluded that under New York law, “just cause can
be broader than breach and here there may be just cause to dismiss
249
without a breach.” For example, despite the plaintiff’s best efforts,
it might be necessary to terminate the plaintiff’s employment because
of adverse market conditions that necessitate “a change in [the employer’s] business strategy, perhaps reducing or closing an opera250
tion.” Accordingly, the court held that the Statute did not bar the
oral promise because the employment relationship could have been
terminated within a year for reasons other than the plaintiff’s
251
breach.
Similarly, in Frazier v. Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, the plaintiff alleged that his employer had given him oral assurances that he
252
would only be terminated for cause.
The court rejected the employer’s Statute defense, asserting without analysis that the plaintiff
“could have been discharged for good cause within a year of having
been hired,” and the contract therefore could have been performed
253
within a year. The court did not address whether the plaintiff had
the right to terminate the employment relationship within one year.
V. SHOULD ORAL PROMISES OF JOB SECURITY GENERALLY BE BARRED
BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS?
A. Broad or Narrow Interpretation of “Performance”?
The stakes involved regarding this issue are clear. If a narrow
conception of “performance” is applied, fewer oral promises of job
security will be enforced. If a broad conception of “performance” is
applied, more oral promises of job security will be enforced. As with
any difficult legal issue, there are factors pulling in each direction.

247

Id. at 105–06.
Id. at 107.
249
Id. at 108.
250
Ohanian, 779 F.2d at 108.
251
Id.
252
574 F. Supp. 318, 320 (E.D. Va. 1983). Frazier was presumably overruled by the
Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Windsor v. Aegis Services, Inc., 869 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1989)
253
Id.
248
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As an initial matter, the issue involves one of statutory construc254
tion. Thus, the plain language of the Statute should be followed.
But this will not resolve every case because the Statute does not define “performance.” Legislative history could be consulted, but no
255
relevant legislative history exists.
As previously discussed, however, the best interpretation of the
one-year provision’s purpose is that it was aimed primarily at employment and service contracts, and it was aimed at such contracts for
a variety of reasons, including that (1) it was unusual to have such an
arrangement in excess of one year; (2) it was often difficult to determine the truth in such cases since they were often brought long after
the alleged oral promise was made (for example, when the employee
or employer terminated the relationship after the typical one-year period had elapsed); (3) the risk of error in such cases would be of particular concern because the remedy for a breach of a long-term contract was likely to be substantial; and (4) it simply was not good policy
to hold a person to such a long-term contract, particularly when the
person had not reduced it to writing and thus perhaps had not given
256
it the desired contemplation. These rationales support a narrow interpretation of “performance” in employment cases, and thus a more
expansive application of the Statute.
As several leading employment law commentators have noted,
[I]t is easy for a fired employee to allege that she received an oral
promise of lengthy employment, and such a promise is often difficult for an employer to disprove. The possibility that the employee will testify fraudulently—or at least “remember” the facts
in a particularly favorable light after learning from her lawyer that
she is otherwise an at-will employee subject to summary dismis257
sal—is a real one.

Just as in the seventeenth century, it might be perceived that defendants are at a disadvantage before a jury in such cases, particularly
because the employee might have more sympathy with the jury than
the employer.

254
See Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S. Ct. 681, 685 (2009) (“As with any question of
statutory interpretation, our analysis begins with the plain language of the statute. It
is well established that, when the statutory language is plain, we must enforce it according to its terms.” (citations omitted)).
255
Cf. Perillo, supra note 61, at 77 (“No one knows why agreements not performable within a year were selected to be within the statute.”).
256
See supra Part II.
257
BALES, HIRSCH & SECUNDA, supra note 1, at 49.

OGORMAN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

ORAL PROMISES OF JOB SECURITY

6/22/2010 1:46 PM

1063

Additionally, as previously discussed, the at-will rule—despite
some erosion—remains the basic premise underlying employment
258
law. The rule therefore continues to implement the reasons it was
likely adopted, including (1) notions of autonomy and freedom of
contract (in the sense that a failure to agree on job security means an
absence of consent to anything other than an at-will relationship); (2)
a desire to retain employer and employee flexibility to promote
wealth maximization; and (3) a desire to keep difficult evidentiary
259
cases out of the court system.
Notably, some of the likely reasons
for adopting the at-will rule are similar to the likely reasons for the
one-year provision of the Statute, including a desire to keep difficult
cases from an evidentiary standpoint out of the court system, a desire
to avoid binding parties to lengthy contractual relationships, and a
desire to ensure that parties are not subject to contractual arrangements they never agreed to. Thus, the continuing vitality of the employment-at-will rule also supports a narrow definition of “performance.”
Accordingly, the likely purposes of the Statute’s one-year provision and the employment-at-will rule dictate a narrow interpretation
of “performance.” But while it is true that the Statute has been
260
treated like common law, it remains a statute, and the Statute
261
makes reference to “performed.” Thus, the plain meaning of “performance” should be applied, and only in what could be referred to
as “close” or “doubtful” cases should deference be given to the likely
purposes of the Statute and the employment-at-will doctrine.

258

See supra Part III.E.
See supra Part III.D.
260
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 78, at 205 (“In one sense, the statute of frauds was
hardly a statute at all. It was so heavily warped by ‘interpretation’ that it had become
little more than a set of common-law rules, worked out in detail by the common law
courts.”). Professor Grant Gilmore stated that the Statute is a celebrated example of
an obsolescent statute being “reabsorbed within the mainstream of the common
law.” GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 96 (1977). I believe that such an
approach by courts to a statute is illegitimate, and has no role in statutory interpretation (assuming it could be called “interpretation”), even if the statute at issue is one
whose origins date back to 1677. If the statute is obsolete, it is the legislature’s role
to revise or repeal it. Such a statute should be applied according to its plain meaning, with deference to its likely purpose in close cases. With respect to the Statute, I
have accepted for purposes of this Article the court-imposed revisions to the Statute
because it is unlikely these revisions will be abandoned. I believe, however, that any
further court-imposed revisions to the Statute should be avoided.
261
See An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 4
(Eng.).
259
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B. Determining If “Performance” Can Occur Within One Year
The starting point for courts is therefore to determine what constitutes “performance,” under a plain meaning approach, by each
party under the alleged oral contract for job security. This requires a
careful analysis of what each party bargained for as part of the ex262
change.
Importantly, as discussed below, under such an analysis,
many oral contracts for job security will be taken out of the Statute
because they will be so-called unilateral contracts, under which performance by the employee is complete at the same time the contract
is formed. Therefore, only the remaining oral contracts for job security that can be construed as bilateral are potentially subject to the
Statute.
1.

Unilateral Contracts

To properly analyze a Statute issue involving an oral promise of
job security, the court must first determine what the employer bar263
gained for in exchange for its alleged promise of job security. Under this analysis, a significant number of employer promises of job security will be taken out of the Statute because it will be determined
that the employer bargained for a return performance, not a return
264
promise. In such a case, the contract will be a unilateral contract,
265
and thus outside the Statute.
As stated by the Michigan Supreme Court:
[T]he typical employment agreement is unilateral in nature.
Generally, the employer makes an offer or promise which the
employee accepts by performing the act upon which the promise
is expressly or impliedly based. The employer’s promise constitutes, in essence, the terms of the employment agreement; the
employee’s action or forbearance in reliance upon the employer’s
promise constitutes sufficient consideration to make the promise
legally binding. In such circumstances, there is no contractual

262

Whether promissory estoppel can be used to circumvent the Statute is beyond
the scope of this Article. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139(1) (1981)
(providing that a promissory estoppel claim is not precluded by the Statute). But see
Stearns v. Emery-Waterhouse Co., 596 A.2d 72, 74–75 (Me. 1991) (rejecting use of
promissory estoppel in employment context to circumvent the Statute).
263
See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich.
1980).
264
See id. at 900; see also Nitz v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 17098, 1995 WL
500073, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1995) (noting that employment contracts are
“often” unilateral contracts).
265
PERILLO, supra note 95, at 670.
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requirement that the promisee do more than perform the act
upon which the promise is predicated in order to legally obligate
266
the promisor.

For example, if an employer orally promises an employee that the
employer will only terminate the employment relationship if the employee does not perform satisfactorily, it is possible that the employee
has not made a return promise in exchange. Rather, the employer
might simply have bargained for the employee to start work with the
employer. If that is the case, the employee’s performance is complete at the same time the contract is formed (even if the employee
has the right to keep working for a longer period), and the employer’s promise is therefore outside of the Statute. Of course, if the employee has not yet performed, he or she has not yet accepted the employer’s offer, and no Statute issue arises because no contract has
been formed yet. Also, whether an employer’s promise in circumstances such as these is unenforceable for other reasons, such as a lack
267
268
of definiteness or consideration, remains a separate issue to be resolved.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to address when an employer’s promise of job security should be construed as inviting a return
promise or a return performance. But the important point is that
such an analysis must be made when determining if an employer’s
promise is barred by the Statute. Only if it is determined that an employer’s promise was given in exchange for a return promise by the
employee, thus constituting a bilateral contract, is the Statute a po269
tential bar. Although return promises can be implied from the cir270
cumstances, courts must be cautious about implying return promises simply to set up the Statute as a potential bar. Implying a return

266

Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 900 (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Montgomery County Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex.
1998) (holding that employer’s oral assurance to employee that she would remain
employed as long as she did a good job was too indefinite to constitute an offer).
268
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 cmt. a, illus. 2 (1981)
(promise to employ agent for three years unenforceable when promise “reserves
power to terminate the agreement at any time”). But see Summers, supra note 5, at
1098 (“The employee, by coming to work, provides sufficient consideration to make
the employer’s promise of continued or permanent employment binding. An offer
by an employer to employ so long as there is a need and the employee’s performance
is satisfactory can be viewed as an offer of a unilateral contract. . . .’”).
269
PERILLO, supra note 95, at 670.
270
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981) (“A promise may be
stated in words either oral or written, or may be inferred wholly or partly from conduct.”).
267
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promise by an employee in one case to set up the Statute as a bar will
result in the case being used as a precedent in a subsequent case by
an employer suing the employee for breach of such an implied promise. The legal theory that is used as a defense in one case will be used
as a claim in another case.
2.

Bilateral Contracts

The Statute therefore only applies to those remaining employer
oral promises for job security that were given in exchange for a return promise. The question then becomes, what were the promises
that were exchanged? This must be determined to evaluate whether
both promises can be performed within one year of the contract’s
271
formation. Identifying the promises will not always be an easy analysis, however, because, as previously noted, promises can be implied
272
from factual circumstances.
a.

Bilateral Contracts with a Definite Term of
Employment Exceeding One Year, with No Right to
Early Termination

If the employer and the employee each orally agreed that the
employment term would extend more than one year from the contract’s formation, with no express or implied-in-fact right to terminate
the relationship sooner, the contract is without question unenforcea273
ble under the Statute.
Although the parties’ duties might be discharged within a year as a result of doctrines such as impracticabili274
275
ty or frustration of purpose, this does not render the contract
capable of being performed within one year because termination of
the contract by operation of law is insufficient to take the contract
276
out of the Statute.
Thus, the possibility that the employee might
die within a year does not take the contract outside of the Statute because the employee’s death would be excusable nonperformance by
271
See id. § 130(1) (“Where any promise in a contract cannot be fully performed
within a year from the time the contract is made, all promises in the contract are
within the Statute of Frauds until one party to the contract completes his performance.” (emphasis added)).
272
Id.
273
4 CORBIN, supra note 63, § 19.4, at 595.
274
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).
275
See id. § 265.
276
See 4 CORBIN, supra note 63, § 19.4, at 596 (“[I]n service cases it is recognized,
at least as a general rule, that termination of duty by operation of law is not identical
with performance of a promise.” (footnote omitted)).
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277

operation of law.
If, however, the parties agree to a lifetime employment contract, the contract is not within the Statute because the
employee might die within a year, and death would complete per278
formance (not excuse it).
b.

Bilateral Contracts with a Right to Terminate the
Employment Relationship Within One Year

Many employment contracts that contemplate employment extending more than one year after formation include an express or
implied-in-fact right by one or both of the parties to terminate the
employment relationship within one year. The application of the Statute to such contracts is complicated. As the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts provides: “[T]he distinction between performance and
excuse for nonperformance is sometimes tenuous; it depends on the
terms and the circumstances, particularly on whether the essential
279
purposes of the parties will be attained.”
i.

A Right to Terminate the Employment Relationship at
Will, with or Without Notice

Perhaps the easiest case should be one in which the employer,
the employee, or both, retain the right to terminate the employment
relationship at will within one year of the contract’s formation.
Whether notice is required before such a right is exercisable should
280
be irrelevant.
In such a case, the parties have agreed that perfor-

277

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt. b, illus. 5 (1981).
Id. illus. 9.
279
Id. cmt. b.
280
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts inexplicably takes the position that
such a distinction is relevant. For example, in one illustration, an employment contract for five years that is subject to termination by either party upon thirty days’ notice is not within the one-year provision. Id. illus. 6. In the next illustration, however, an employment contract for five years, which provides that the employee may quit
at any time if he gives thirty days’ notice, is held to be within the one-year provision.
Id. illus. 7. It has been suggested that the apparent inconsistency between the illustrations is the result of the peculiar New York rule discussed previously, under which
the Statute is inapplicable only if the defendant had the option to terminate the contract within one year. 4 CORBIN, supra note 63, § 19.6, at 603 n.6. This is based on
the fact that the illustration is premised in part on a New York case. Id. But, as noted
by Professor Caroline Brown, “the difficulty posed by the Restatement’s illustrations
cannot entirely be explained by allusion to the New York cases: for one thing, illustration 7 places no emphasis at all upon the identity of A, who holds the right of
termination; for another, we are not told whether A is plaintiff or defendant.” Id.
Professor Perillo has noted that “[i]llustrations 6 and 7 appear to be contradictory.”
PERILLO, supra note 95, at 669 n.2.
278
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mance is only to last as long as one of the parties desires. For example, if the employee retains the right to terminate at will, it is likely
that the employee has promised nothing more than to start work for
the employer, and perhaps to perform his or her work satisfactorily
281
while employed. If that is so, the employee completes the promised
performance merely upon commencing work (and perhaps continuing to perform satisfactorily while at work), and the employee’s exercise of the right to terminate the employment relationship would occur after full performance of the employee’s promise. In these cases,
the employer’s duties under the contract would also be fully performed upon termination of the employment relationship because
the employer has kept the employee employed for as long as the employee desired. Each party’s duties have thus been discharged
through performance.
Of course, the employee’s right to continue receiving wages is
subject to the condition precedent of the employee continuing to
perform services, but this is simply a condition to payment, not a
282
promise by the employee to continue working. Also, the preceding
discussion assumed that there are no post-employment duties to
which the parties are subject that would necessarily extend beyond
283
one year from the contract’s formation.
As previously discussed, some courts, most notably the court in
Deevy v. Porter, have held that the termination of the employment relationship under such circumstances would frustrate the essential
purposes of the contract, particularly when the parties contemplated
284
a term of employment for more than one year. In fact, the majority
view is that a right to terminate a contract for any reason whatsoever
285
is the defeasance of the contract, not its performance.
But if the
parties agreed that one or both of them could terminate at will, al-

281
See, e.g., Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 779 F.2d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 1985)
(inferring a promise by the employee to give his “best efforts”).
282
On the distinction between an express condition and a promise, see PERILLO,
supra note 95, at 365–66.
283
However, it has been held that “a contract whereby an employee is to be paid a
bonus or commission on an annual basis but which cannot be calculated and paid
until after the books have been closed is not within the Statute although the bonus
cannot be calculated until after the end of the year.” Id. at 667. Also, a noncompetition agreement is generally considered capable of being performed within a year because the employee’s death would be the equivalent of full performance.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt. b & illus. 9 (1981).
284
Deevy v. Porter, 95 A.2d 596, 597–99 (N.J. 1953).
285
PERILLO, supra note 95, at 668.
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though the parties might have hoped or expected for a longer relationship, they agreed that it need not last that long. The majority
view, including decisions like Deevy v. Porter, runs contrary to the established rule that a contract is not within the Statute’s one-year provision as long as it is capable of being performed within one year,
even if the parties hoped that performance would last longer. Accordingly, such an agreement is capable of being performed within one
year.
Decisions like Deevy v. Porter and French v. Sabey Corp. misconstrue
the essential purpose of the contract. When the parties agree that
one party retains the right to terminate the employment relationship
for any reason, the contract’s essential purpose is to provide employment for only as long as that party desires. To suggest that the essential purpose of the contract was employment for a definite term cannot be reconciled with the at-will termination provision. The
appearance of a promise to work for a definite term is an illusion. It
makes no sense to say that a party has promised to work for one year,
unless he or she chooses to stop working sooner. And absent a promise to work more than a year from the contract’s formation, the Statute is not a bar.
It is certainly true that, if decisions like Deevy v. Porter and French
v. Sabey Corp. were incorrect, the likely purposes of the Statute could
be easily circumvented. An employee could avoid the Statute by
simply arguing that under the terms of the contract he or she (but
not the employer, of course) retained the right to terminate the relationship at will. But such an assertion might lack credibility and,
therefore, make the likelihood of success small. Also, such an assertion might result in the court concluding that the employer’s promise
lacked consideration because the employee did not provide a return
promise. The employee could avoid the consideration issue by alleging that he or she only retained the right to terminate the relationship upon a certain amount of notice, but such an assertion would
probably lack credibility.
ii.

Bilateral Contracts with a Right to Terminate the
Employment Relationship upon the Occurrence of a
Specific Event

A bilateral contract under which the employer and the employee
each agree to an employment term of longer than one year from its
formation, subject to an explicit or implied-in-fact right to terminate
upon the occurrence of a specific event (as opposed to at the mere
will of either party) presents a more complicated case. In such a situ-
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ation, the event giving rise to the right to terminate the employment
relationship must be analyzed to determine if the event is closer to
one that frustrates the contract’s purpose, or closer to performance.
If the event is a breach of the contract, even a nonmaterial
breach, it should not be considered performance of the contract, because a breach is not performance. It will not always be easy, however, to determine if an event is a breach. For example, an employer
who has promised job security to an employee generally retains the
right to terminate the employee for poor performance or miscon286
duct. Such a right might be explicit or implied-in-fact. It is not always clear, however, that such an event is a breach of contract by the
employee; it might simply be a condition to continued employment.
To determine if the event was a breach, it would be necessary to determine if the employee explicitly or impliedly promised to perform
well, or to meet the job requirements (such that the employee could
be sued for breach for failing to perform as promised).
In any event, however, such events cannot be construed as at287
taining the parties’ “essential purposes,” and are closer to frustrating them. For example, it has been asserted that “with a promise to
employ someone as long as he meets the job requirements, the occurrence of the contingency—the employee’s failure to meet the requirements—frustrates and cuts off the continuing performance of
288
the contract.” Accordingly, termination based on such events does
not constitute performance.
Some definite-term employment contracts permit the employer
to terminate the employment relationship if the employer is not sub289
jectively satisfied with the employee’s performance. In such a case,
the employer might act unreasonably, but in good faith, and the employer would still be entitled to terminate the employment relationship. One commentator has argued that in such a contract, “the par-

286

See, e.g., Ohanian, 779 F.2d at 107; Hetes v. Schefman & Miller Law Office, 393
N.W.2d 577, 578 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
287
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt. b (1981) (providing that
the distinction between performance and excuse for nonperformance “depends on
the terms and the circumstances, particularly on whether the essential purposes of the
parties will be attained.” (emphasis added)).
288
Milazzo v. O’Connell, 925 F. Supp. 1331, 1341 (N.D. Ill. 1996), aff’d, 108 F.3d
129 (7th Cir. 1997).
289
See, e.g., Fursmidt v. Hotel Abbey Holding Corp., 200 N.Y.S.2d 256, 260 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1960) (holding that satisfaction clause involving valet and laundry service
to a hotel entitled the hotel to terminate the relationship if the hotel was not genuinely and honestly satisfied with the services).
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ties intend for the contingency, the employee’s unsatisfactory work
290
for example, to constitute full performance of the contract.”
Although this is a more difficult case, such a termination should
still be construed as closer to a frustration of the contract’s purpose
than performance. Under such a contract, the employer bargained
for performance by the employee that would subjectively satisfy the
employer. If the employee did not provide such performance, the
employee has not provided the employer with that which the contract
was intended to secure. It can hardly be said that the parties’ “essential purpose” was to have a relationship that would only last as long as
the employer was satisfied with the employee’s performance. Rather,
the essential purpose was to have a satisfactory employment relationship.
The more complicated issue arises when the employer has retained the right to terminate the employment relationship for reasons other than poor performance by the employee. For example,
although some courts seemingly hold that an employment contract
for a definite term of employment does not include an implied right
291
to terminate based on the elimination of the employee’s position,
other courts hold that an employer retains the right to terminate for
292
economic reasons. Thus, some courts have construed a promise to
terminate the employment relationship only for “just cause” as including the right to terminate for reasons such as adverse market
293
conditions.
For the former courts, the contract would unquestionably be
within the Statute—assuming it was a definite-term contract for more
than one year from formation—because any termination prior to the
end of the employment period would be a breach. Even for the latter
courts, however, the event permitting termination is closer to excusable nonperformance than performance, and thus the contract should
still be within the Statute. At a minimum, any event not addressed in
the contract that would have discharged a party’s duties under the
290

Haroutunian, supra note 8, at 510.
See, e.g., Grappone v. City of Miami Beach, 495 So. 2d 838, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986) (holding that complaint stated a claim for breach of definite-term employment contract when employer eliminated position); Helberg v. Cmty. Work &
Dev. Ctr. Indus., Inc., No. CX-93-958, 1994 WL 1121, at *2–3 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 4,
1994) (holding that definite-term contract did not include right to terminate employee because position was eliminated).
292
See, e.g., Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 779 F.2d 101, 107–08 (2d Cir.
1985).
293
See id.
291
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294

doctrines of supervening impracticability or supervening frustration
295
of purpose should be considered a discharge through excusable
nonperformance. Because discharge under the doctrines of impracticability and frustration of purpose are considered excusable non296
performance, the mere fact that the parties addressed the occurrence of the event in the contract does not necessarily mean the
event should be considered “performance” instead of excusable non297
performance.
Therefore, merely because the parties indicate that
an employee’s duties under a definite-term contract would be discharged as a result of the employee’s death, the death would not be
considered “performance” because it is an event that would have discharged the employee’s duties under the doctrine of impracticability
298
if it had not been addressed in the contract.
With respect to events that would not have discharged a party’s
duties under the doctrines of impracticability or frustration of purpose, the issue is whether such events are closer to the types of events
that would fall within those doctrines or closer to an alternative method of performance. Because such cases will present a myriad of different contingencies that will permit termination of the employment
relationship, each case must be analyzed to determine if the event is
closer to performance or closer to impracticability or frustration. In
general, an event that is not within either party’s control would seem
to be closer to an event that would have discharged the party’s duties
under the doctrines of impracticability or frustration of purpose. Also, as previously discussed, in “close” or “doubtful” cases, the likely
purposes of the Statute’s one-year provision and the employment-atwill doctrine dictate that discharge as a result of the event should be
considered excusable nonperformance.

294

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).
See id. § 265.
296
See 4 CORBIN, supra note 63, § 19.4, at 596 (“[I]n service cases it is recognized,
at least as a general rule, that termination of duty by operation of law is not identical
with performance of a promise.” (footnote omitted)).
297
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt. b (1981) (“The possibility that such a discharge or excuse may occur within a year is not a possibility that
the contract will be ‘performed’ within a year. This is so even though the excuse is articulated in the agreement.” (emphasis added)).
298
Id. illus. 5; see also id. § 262 (“If the existence of a particular person is necessary
for the performance of a duty, his death or such incapacity as makes performance
impracticable is an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made.”).
295
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Under this approach, an express or implied right to terminate
based on adverse business conditions is closer to impracticability or
frustration of purpose than performance. Even though adverse market conditions are generally not events that permit discharge under
299
the doctrines of frustration or impracticability, such an event would
be closer to frustration of purpose than an alternative method of performance. The illustrations in the Second Restatement of Contracts
show that for discharge based on the occurrence of an event to be
considered “performance,” the primary object of the contract must
thereby be fully performed as a result of the event’s occurrence. For
example, a promise to make support payments to a child until the
child becomes twenty-one years old can be performed within a year
because “[i]f the child dies within a year, the primary object of fur300
nishing necessaries to the child will be fully ‘performed.’” Likewise,
a noncompetition agreement that extends more than one year can be
performed within one year because the employee’s death within one
301
year would give the employer “the equivalent of full performance.”
With respect to an express or implied right to terminate a definite-term employment contract within a year based on adverse market conditions, the occurrence of such an event does not result in the
primary object of the contract being fully attained. Unlike a contract
that reserves to one party the right to terminate the contract at will,
the primary object of a definite-term employment contract under
which each party is bound to the term is to have an employment duration for the full period. An early termination should not be considered an alternative method of performance because that would suggest that if the event occurred, the parties would agree that each
party’s expected benefits under the contract had been realized.
Without question, the employee would not feel this way. Additionally, if this were considered a “close” or “doubtful” case (which I do not
think it is), the purpose of the Statute’s one-year provision and the
purpose of the employment-at-will doctrine dictate that discharge be
considered excusable nonperformance.
Accordingly, the court’s conclusion in Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car
System, Inc. that an employer’s right to terminate the employment relationship because of adverse market conditions was equivalent to
299

See, e.g., Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 296 (N.Y. 1987)
(holding that liability insurance crisis did not discharge duty to obtain such insurance).
300
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt. b, illus. 8 (1981).
301
Id. illus. 9.
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performance was incorrect. The court incorrectly concluded that
simply because it would not have been a breach, it meant the contract
302
could be performed within a year.
Importantly, however, because
the contract was not for a definite term but instead seemed to be a
promise for lifetime employment, the possibility of the employee’s
death within one year should have constituted the equivalent of full
performance.
Other agreements provide that a particular event unrelated to
the employee’s performance or adverse market conditions will terminate the employment relationship. For example, as previously discussed, in Coan v. Orsinger, the plaintiff alleged that his employer
orally promised him the job of resident manager of an apartment development, with the job to last until he either completed law school
(which he had just started) or was obliged to discontinue those stu303
dies. In a case such as Coan, it is necessary to make a factual finding
304
as to the “essential purposes of the parties” and the “primary object”
305
of the contract. If the essential purpose was simply to provide the
employee with a job for as long as he was in law school, the occurrence of the event—the employee being obliged to discontinue his
law studies—would be closer to performance. If, however, the essential purpose was to provide the parties with a three-year employment
relationship, the occurrence of the event would be closer to frustration of purpose.
If, after reviewing the available evidence, the issue remains
doubtful, the event should be considered closer to frustration. First,
it is the type of event that might discharge the employee’s duties under the doctrine of frustration of purpose. Being obliged to discontinue law studies was likely an event whose non-occurrence was a “ba306
sic assumption on which the contract was made,” and it might have
been a job needed to help pay for law school while the employee was
in the area. Second, the event was one essentially outside of the parties’ control. Third, such a finding would promote the purposes of
the Statute’s one-year provision and the employment-at-will doctrine.
Professor Richard Lord, who contends that the case was incorrectly decided, states that “what the court appears to have overlooked

302
303
304
305
306

779 F.2d 101, 107–08 (2d Cir. 1985).
265 F.2d 575, 575–76 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt. b (1981).
Id. illus. 8.
Id. § 265.
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is that if anything had happened to interrupt plaintiff’s studies, the
performance of his duties (his promise to serve) as residential manager would have been complete, and nothing more would have been
307
required of him. . . .”
But Professor Lord’s approach would eradicate the distinction between performance and excusable nonperformance in employment cases. Any event, other than a breach, that
would permit a party to terminate the employment relationship within a year would constitute performance because the employee worked
as long as he or she was legally required to. This approach is inconsistent with the rule that a party’s discharge through excuse is not the
equivalent of performance, and ignores the obligation to determine
if the parties’ “essential purposes” would be attained by the occurrence of the event.
VI. CONCLUSION
When addressing a Statute of Frauds defense to a breach of contract claim by an employee alleging an oral promise of job security,
the court must carefully determine what express or implied promises
have been made by each party. Often, an employee will not have
made any promise, and the employee’s performance will be complete
when the contract is formed.
Even when the employee has made a return promise, often the
only express or implied-in-fact promise made by the employee will be
a promise to start work, to use his or her best efforts upon starting
work, or both. If these are the only express or implied-in-fact promises made by the employee, the employee will retain the right to terminate the employment relationship at any time. If the employee
terminates the employment relationship within a year of entering into the contract, the employee will have fully performed his or her
promises. Likewise, the employer will have fully performed its promise of providing job security as long as the employee chooses to maintain the employment relationship. Also, because a “just cause” termination provision is the equivalent of a promise of lifetime
employment, the contract can be performed within a year as a result
of the employee’s death.
With respect to the right to terminate a definite-term employment contract because of a particular event, the court must determine whether discharge as a result of the event’s occurrence is closer
to discharge under the doctrines of impracticability or frustration of
307

9 WILLISTON, supra note 83, § 24:3, at 452 n.45.
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purpose, or to performance. In making this determination, the court
must consider the parties’ “essential purposes” and the primary object of the contract. Only if the event accomplishes the parties’ essential purposes and the primary object of the contract would the event
be considered the equivalent of full performance. If the event is one
that would have discharged a party’s duties under the doctrines of
impracticability or frustration of purpose, it is closer to excusable
nonperformance than performance. Also, if the event is one outside
of the parties’ control, it is likely to be an event closer to excusable
nonperformance. Further, in “close” or “doubtful” cases, the purpose of the Statute’s one-year provision and the purpose of the employment-at-will doctrine dictate a finding that the event is closer to
excusable nonperformance than performance.

